PROTECTION OF COMPETITION THROUGH THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY - THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION by Liakopoulos, Dimitris
 
 
 
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 13 – n. 2 – p. 286-334 – Jul./Dez. 2018 
 
286 
PROTECTION OF COMPETITION THROUGH THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL 
CERTAINTY: THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
PROTEÇÃO À COMPETIÇÃO PELO PRINCÍPIO SEGURANÇA JURÍDICA: O PAPEL DA 
CORTE DE JUSTIÇA DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA 
 
 
 
Dimitris Liakopoulos* 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The present work is concentrated on the analysis of the rule of reason of law 
in European Union law and especially in the sector of european competition law, where the 
rule of reason is a guarantee of the crystallization of the rules that constituted the normative 
basis for the law to access to the market, to the tariffs of regulated services rather than to the 
management of infrastructures, etc. The rule of reason stands as predictability of the conse-
quences of behavior as we see from the analysis of the Court of Justice of the European Uni-
on and especially according to the preliminary ruling trying to guarantee the principle under 
examination as fundamental of the good functioning of the European market, both in the 
access phase and in the operational phase, to the point that any other Community law is ap-
plied only in coherence and full compatibility with the latter. 
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RESUMO: O presente trabalho concentra-se na análise da regra da razão de Direito no Di-
reito da União Europeia e especialmente no setor do Direito europeu da concorrência, onde a 
regra da razão é uma garantia da cristalização das regras que constituíram a base normativa 
para o direito ao acesso ao mercado, às tarifas dos serviços regulamentados, mais do que à 
gestão de infraestruturas etc. A regra da razão é a previsibilidade das consequências do com-
portamento, como vemos na análise do Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia e, em especial, 
de acordo com a decisão preliminar, que tenta garantir o princípio em análise, como funda-
mental para o bom funcionamento do mercado europeu, tanto na fase de acesso, como na 
fase operacional, a ponto de qualquer outro Direito comunitário ser aplicado apenas em coe-
rência e compatibilidade total com este último. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Compliance with the principle of legal certainty also plays a fundamental role in the 
application of the rules on free competition. It is important that companies operating within 
the single market are aware of the limits within which they can move in order to avoid that an 
excessive level of indeterminacy about the conduct that is considered illegitimate by european 
law does not result in a tightening by part of the traders, who would thus be less inclined to 
invest and to conclude commercial transactions. 
Among the different meanings that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has attributed to the principle of legal certainty,1 under the law of competition the 
expression “legal certainty” has in fact become synonymous with predictability, (M. 
DREHER, M. ADAM, 2006, p. 259 et seq.) clarity and transparency of the procedures 
through which the European Commission (EC) comes to establish which behaviors are 
punishable and to what extent. (T.C. HARTLEY, 2010, p. 146 et seq.) 
Among the rules of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that 
has most attracted attention in relation to the level of certainty of the law guaranteed to 
companies operating within the European Union, there is certainly art. 101 TFUE2 “allowing” 
                                               
1  Among these the most relevant, i.e., those that have found greater application in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, are: a) the prohibition of retroactivity of the rules (CJEU, 98/78, A.  
Racke  v. Hauptzollamt  Mainz of 25 January 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:211,  ECR 00069; 99/78,  Weingut  
Gustav  Decker  KG v. Hauptzollamt Landau of 25 January 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:15, ECR 00101; C-
34/92,  GruSa  Fleisch  GmbH  &  Co  KG  v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas of 15 July 1993, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:317, 1-4147; joined cases C-74 and 75/00, P Falck SpA and Acciaierie di Bolzano SpA v. 
Commission of 24 September 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:524, 1-7869; C-376/02, Stichting 'Goed Wonen v. 
Staatssecretaris van Financien of 26 April 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:251, 1-3445; C-459/02,  Willy  Gerekens  
et  Association  Agricole  pour  la  Promotion  de  la Commercialisation Laitiere Procola v. Luxembourg of 
15 July 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:454, 1-7315; C-161/06,  Skoma-Lux  sro  v.  Celni  feditelstvi  Olomouc of 
12 May 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:773, 1-10841); b) the need to enact clear and specific law (C-63/93, Duff 
and others v. Minister for Agriculture and Food e Attorney General of 15 February 1996, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:51, I-00569; 169/80,  Gondrand  Frères of 9 July 1981, ECLI:EU:C:1981:181, ECR 01931; 
joined cases 92 and 93/87, Commission v. France and United Kingdom of 22 February 1989, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:77, ECR 00405); c) the protection of legitimate expectations (C-120/86, Mulder v. Minister 
van Landbouw en Visserijof 28 April 1988, ECLI:EU:C:1988:213, ECR 02321; C-333/08, European 
Commission v. Republic of France of 28 January 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:44, I-00757). 
2  See, ex multis, A. HARTKAMP, C. SIBURGH & W. DEVROE. Cases, materials and text on European 
Union law and private law. Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 282 et seq.; K. LENAERTS, I. 
MASELIS & K. GUTMAN. European Union procedural law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 133 
et seq.; M. WIERZBOWSKI & A. GUBRYNOWICZ. International investment law for the 21st century, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015; A.H. TÜRK. Judicial review in European Union law. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishers, 2010. L. WOODS & P. WATSON. Steiner & Woods European Union law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 37 et seq. C. BARNARD & S. PEERS. European Union law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 788 et seq. E. BERRY, M.Y. HOMEWOOD & B. BOGUSZ. Complete 
European Union law. Texts, cases and materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; G. CONWAY. 
European Union law. London & New York: Routledge, 2015; F. NICOLA & B. DAVIES. European Union 
law stories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017; J. USHERWOOD & S. PINDER. The European 
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the growth of various theories elaborated on the analysis of the restrictive agreements of 
competition, as well as the effects that these two different approaches have on the level of 
legal certainty. Each of these methods (european legislation and jurisprudence) responds to 
different needs, i) to ensure the economic operators of the market an adequate level of 
predictability and ii) not to sacrifice the flexibility that the rules on competition must have to 
reflect the best economic changes within the market. However, finding the right balance 
between the pros and cons of these two theories is far from easy. 
While there is no doubt that the per se rule approach (J. PARISH, 2016, p. 464 et 
seq.) ensures full compliance with the principle of legal certainty, as it allows companies in 
the Member States to know in advance the legal consequences that derive from their actions 
without the need for particularly detailed assessments, it is equally true that such a rigid 
scheme runs the risk of leading to a generalization of the conduct under investigation, as well 
as to the adoption of unjust decisions by the EC. (E. EASTERBROOK, 1986, p. 135 et seq.; 
A.I. GAVIL, 2012, p. 738 et seq.) 
On the other hand, the rule of reason, while allowing a more flexible and reasoned 
assessment that takes into account the relevant case factors in case to decide the legitimacy of 
the conduct, entails high defensive costs for companies as well as not ensuring sufficient 
predictability about the outcome of the decisions adopted. (H.J. HOVENKAMP, 2018, p. 298 
et seq.) 
 
2.  PER SE RULE V. RULE OF REASON: ORIGIN AND DISTINCTIVE 
CHARACTER OF THE RULE OF REASON 
 
The contraposition between per se rule and rule of reason (R.H. BORK, 1966, p. 374 
et seq.; R.H. BORK, 1978; A. CHRISTIANSEN & W. KERBER, 2006, p. 215-244; E. 
BRUNET, 1984-1985, p. 5 et seq.; G.H. MONTAGUE, 1958, p. 70 et seq.; V. GHOSAL, 
2011, p. 738 et seq.; J. NOWAG, 2016, p. 220 et seq.) has its origins in the US antitrust right 
in relation to the analysis of the conduct governed by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 This 
                                                                                                                                                   
Union. A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. J.L. DA CRUZ VILAÇA. 
European Union law and integration. Twenty years of judicial application of European Union law. Oxford & 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014; T.H. FOLSOM. Principles of European Union law, including Brexit. 
Minnesota: West Academic, 2017, p. 278 et seq. R. GEIGER, D.E. KHAN & M. KOTZUR. EUV/AEUV. 
München: C.H. Beck, 2016.  M. DECHEVA. Recht der europäischen Union. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018. 
3  In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, Justice Souter noted the American Banana cases but then said without 
explanation that “the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact 
produce some substantial effect in the United States.” 509 U.S. 764, 795-896 (1993); see also id. at 814 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the presumption has been “overcome” in Sherman Act litigation and citing 
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distinction is based on the belief that agreements between companies can be divided into two 
very clear categories: anti-competitive and pro-competitive. (T.A. PIRAINO, 1990-1991, p. 
685 et seq.) This implies that pre-competitive agreements can enjoy the benefit of the doubt 
about their legality thanks to the rule of reason approach, which takes into consideration any 
positive effects for the market that can justify them; on the contrary, following the method 
dictated by the per se rule, certainly anti-competitive agreements should be sanctioned 
without further evaluation and without giving companies the opportunity to demonstrate any 
benefits deriving from the agreement.4 
These two different approaches presuppose very different methods of evaluation, to 
the point that traditionally (D.L. BESCHLE, 1987, p. 475 et seq.) the rule of reason leads to a 
decision of legality of the agreement, while following the per se rule you end up sanctioning 
the companies that have signed the agreement. (J. PARISH, 2016, p. 464 et seq.) 
In fact, the jurisprudential evolution of the rule of reason, has shown that, despite this 
method allows to sanction in a more targeted and selective with respect to the rules per se 
effectively anti-competitive restrictions, has as its main “side effect” the increase of level of 
legal uncertainty in terms of scarce predictability of the outcome of court decisions. From its 
introduction to today there have been a multitude of formulations of the rule of reason by the 
US courts, sometimes more flexible sometimes more structured, which not only have not 
contributed to increase the level of predictability on the evaluation of the agreements, but 
                                                                                                                                                   
earlier decisions of the Court and the Second Circuit). Even when the Court declines to apply the Sherman 
Act to conduct abroad, it does not do so based on the presumption. see F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004). Today, amendments to the Sherman Act may make its 
extraterritorial application clear, but the Court had already ruled that the statute applied extraterritorially in 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. See W.N. ESKRIDGE & E.L. BAER. The continuum of deference: Supreme Court 
treatment of agency statutory interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan. In: Georgetown Law Journal, 96, 
2008, p. 1083, 1111-1115. E.A. POSNER & C.R. SUNSTEIN. Chevronizing foreign relations law. In: Yale 
Law Journal, 116, 2007, p. 1170, 1198 (noting that: “[...] the Law has-peculiarly-not settled on a general 
principle of deference when an executive agency advances an interpretation of a statute that has foreign 
relations implications [...]”).The decision to impose a compliance monitor depends on the specific facts of the 
case. According to the Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the following factors: 
“[...] determine whether a monitor is appropriate, namely: “seriousness of the offense; duration of the 
misconduct; pervasiveness of the misconduct, including whether the conduct cuts across geographic and/or 
product lines; nature and size of the company; quality of the company’s compliance program at the time of 
the misconduct; subsequent remediation efforts [...]”. Department of Justice, Criminal Divise and seccurity, 
Enf't Divise, A Resource guide to the U.S. Foreign corrupt practices Act, at 71 (2012). J. JORDAN. Recent 
developments in the foreign corrupt practices act and the new UK Bribery Act: a global trend towards greater 
accountability in the prevention of foreign bribery. In: New York Journal of Law & Business, 2011, p. 853 et 
seq. 
4  See the next cases: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) and Northern Pac. 
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For details see: E. ELHALGE & D. GERADIN. Global 
competition law and economics. Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing, 2011. 
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have perhaps acutely the problem. 
Even before the establishment of the Supreme Court, in Mitchel v. Reynolds case5 the 
Queen's Bench Court allowed some companies to provide a justification for the restriction of 
their trade, using standards of reasonableness that demonstrated the pro-competitive effects of 
their conduct, based on economic parameters and efficiency. 
In 19116 the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act7, for the first time, stating that the nature of such a general prohibition such as that in the 
section cited required an assessment of the restrictions of competition according to criteria of 
reasonableness. Using the Court’s words: “the rule of reason becomes the guide”. (N. 
ETCHEVERRY ESTÁZULAS; D.P. FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO, 2018) 
A more detailed definition of the rule of reason was subsequently offered in the 
famous Chicago Board of Trade case:8 the Supreme Court made it clear that, unlike what 
happened in the Mitchel case, a restrictive conduct of the market can be justified solely on the 
basis of strictly economic reasons. In fact, after having found that in the case in question the 
restriction had not altered the market prices, but rather had strengthened the competition 
within it, the Court considered that it could authorize the agreement having passed the 
reasonableness test. 
According to the interpretation of the rule of reason offered by the Supreme Court on 
                                               
5  Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). For details see: M.A. CRABER & H. GILMAN. 
The complete american constitutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 314 et seq. 
6  Case Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 
Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (“(Maximum RPM may) cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrict 
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.”), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); 29 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. 
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). The reasoning behind the Albrecht decision was flawed. In argument see: M.A. 
CARRIER. The rule of reason: An empirical update for the 21st Century. In: George Mason Law Review, 16, 
2009, p. 828 et seq. See also: N. ETCHEVERRY ESTÁZULAS & D.P. FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO. 
Enforcement and effectiveness of the law. Berlin: Springer, 2018. 
7  According to Section 1 dello Sherman Act: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished  [...] or 
by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court [...]”. 
8  Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 46 U.S. 231 (1918) (regulating grain traders): “[...] every agreement 
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true 
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question 
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, 
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts [...]”. For details see: L.P. SAWYER. 
California fair trade. Antitrust and the politics of fairness in U.S. competition policy. In: Business History 
Review, 90 (1), 2016, p. 32 et seq. H. HOVENKAMP. Leegin. The role of reason and vertical agreements, 
University of Iowa Legal studies research paper. N. 10-40, College of Law, University of Iowa, 2010. 
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this occasion, it is necessary that the company that has concluded the agreement or put in 
place the abusive conduct, concretely demonstrates its pro-competitive effects with reference 
to the relative market of reference and the demand/supply curve. In the Chicago Board of 
Trade, therefore, are specifically specified the criteria on which to assess whether a market 
restriction may or may not be justified in the light of the rule of reason: according to the Judge 
Brandeis, reference should be made to the specific circumstances of the business, the 
conditions of the market before and after the restriction of competition, the nature and 
purpose of the conduct under investigation and finally the effects that this had on competition 
within the market. (R.H. COASE, 1984, p. 230 et seq.) 
With specific reference to vertical (D. DANIEL SOKOL, 2014, p. 1005 et seq.; F. 
WIJCKMANS & F. TUYTSCHAEVER, 2011; N. VETTAS, 2010, p. 844 et seq.) and 
horizontal agreements, their validity must be demonstrated exclusively through the analysis of 
the effects they have had in practice on demand and supply within the market: if following the 
agreement there is an increase in price, there is a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
otherwise there is no reason not to justify it. 
The rule of reason based on the purely economic analysis of restrictive conduct and 
their effects is at the basis of the doctrine elaborated by the Chicago School,9  which assumes 
that economic efficiency is in fact, for the rules of antitrust law, (H. FIRST & S. WEBER 
WALLER, 2013, p. 2545 et seq.) the goal to be achieved. The most immediate way of 
achieving this result is, on the one hand, in limiting the interference of the judicial and 
administrative authorities within the markets to the minimum necessary and, on the other 
hand, in ensuring that a particular conduct can not be declared contrary to the Sherman Act 
without showing the anti-competitive effects on the reference market. The companies must, 
therefore, have the opportunity to explain and demonstrate the reasonableness of the conduct 
under examination. 
Both the Supreme Court and most of the Federal Courts have made extensive use of 
                                               
9  Contrary to the achievement of more strictly political and social objectives which, according to the Chicago 
school, are irrelevant to antitrust law. In contrast to this vision is the Interventionist model, shared mainly by 
the Congress and public opinion, which underlines the importance of orienting the interpretation of the 
antitrust rules in favor of the pursuit of more socially useful ends such as technological innovation, the 
economic independence of small businesses, the diversification of the offer, etc. For a more in-depth look at 
the interventionist model, see: A. BOHLING. Simplified rule of reason for vertical restraints: integrating 
social goals, economic analysis, and sylvania. In: Iowa Law Review, 64 (4), 1979, p. 462 et seq. US. 
Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, (Jan.-June) Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 
1199 (Special Supp. Jan. 24, 1985); Conference Committee Clears Restriction on Justice Department's 
Advocacy on RPM, (July-Dec.) Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1138, at 723-24 (Nov. 3, 1983). 
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the model of the so-called rule of reason, preferring it to the approach of the “rival” per se 
rule, (J. PARISH, 2016, p. 464 et seq.) on the assumption that the application of the antitrust 
rules by the courts must be flexible. He refused, in other words, to sanction an agreement 
because of its existence alone. The model elaborated by the Court in the Chicago Board of 
Trade case has caused some criticism because of the difficulty and the high costs that the 
companies had to support in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of their conduct. (F.H. 
EASTERBROOK, 1984, p. 4 et seq.) 
In order to overcome these problems, in the following years different approaches of 
rule of reason10, were proposed, which proved to be unsatisfactory, since the Court failed to 
clarify to what conduct the rule of reason characterized by a more “lean” investigation is 
applied, compared to the more in-depth analysis, making it impossible to predict which type 
of analysis, and consequently the criteria, the Court would have used when assessing the 
restrictions. 
The antitrust law commentators put forward hopes of obtaining clarity in the 
California Dental Association (CDA)11 case, in which the Supreme Court was called upon to 
decide on the alleged violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by the CDA. Both the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Ninth Court at the appeal found the violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act through an analysis based on a “quick look” rule of reason, applicable to those 
conducted that, although not attributable to the category of illegal restrictions per se, they 
produce with sufficient evidence anti-competitive effects that do not require a more in-depth 
investigation. The Supreme Court, however, held that such a summary investigation of the 
restriction was not appropriate in the case in question. While recognizing that the “quick 
look” analysis represents a valid approach to restrictions that are recognized as prima facie 
anti-competitive effects,12 the Court found that the reasons that led the CDA to prohibit 
                                               
10  The “structured”, the “truncated” rule of reason and the “quick look analysis” were proposed between the 
federal and state courts, depending on the level of in-depth analysis of the survey. The “quick look analysis” 
approach has also been endorsed by the Supreme Court in the following cases: NCAA v. Board of Regents, 
468 U.S. 85 (1984); FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). See in argument and for 
analysis: A. MEESE. In praise of all or nothing dichotomous categories: why antitrust law should reject the 
quick look. In: Georgetown Law Journal, 104, 2016, p. 840 et seq. S. VAHEESAN. The evolving populisms 
of antitrust. In: Nebraska Law Review, 93, 2014, p. 380 et seq. E.D. CANAVAGH. Whatever happened to 
quick look? In: University Miami Business Law Review, 26, 2017, p. 46 et seq. 
11  California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999). See A. JONES & B. SUFRIN. 
European Union competition law. Text, cases and materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
12  The Court held, in fact, that the “quick look” rule of reason is applicable “when the great likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained, i.e., where the anticompetitive effects are obvious”. See 
also: C. ISTVÁN NAGY. European Union and United States competition law: divided in unity? The rule on 
restrictive agreements and vertical intra-brand restaints. New York: Routledge, 2016. 
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certain advertising activities should be better explored since, apparently, they seemed to be 
linked to the need to avoid the increase in the information asymmetry between patient and 
doctor, through the dissemination of deceptive or misleading messages.13 The Court decided 
to re-issue the decision to the Ninth Court for a more in-depth examination, since the 
restriction put in place by the CDA could have been justified i) to avoid the information 
asymmetry between patient and doctor; ii) for the difficulties in making a comparison 
between the packages of professional services; iii) for the difficulties in verifying information 
on prices and services; iv) for the trust relationship that some patients have with their doctor. 
The Court has in fact given the endorsement both to the “quick look” rule of reason and to 
that based on a more in-depth analysis, leaving, therefore, unaltered the doubts about the 
criteria through which to decide from time to time which approach to follow. In an attempt to 
come up with a rule of reason that would be as coherent and predictable as possible, 
especially with regard to the reasons for justifying market restrictions, the Court has actually 
confused ideas even more, using reasonableness tests based on criteria that are always 
different because they are aimed at sometimes pursuing the protection of competition in 
general, sometimes the welfare of consumers and so on. (E. RAMIREZ, 2015, p. 2052 et seq.)  
According to our opinion “[...] the case for the quick look does not withstand 
scrutiny. The quick look adds an additional layer to the analysis of restraints that avoid per se 
condemnation, namely, an inquiry into whether the challenged agreement is inherently 
suspect. The result of this inquiry is generally outcome determinative, and both plaintiffs and 
defendants will predictably invest significant resources in attempting to convince the tribunal 
that the challenged restraint is or is not inherently suspect. Tribunals, in turn, will expend 
significant resources assessing these contending arguments. The significant costs of this 
threshold inherently suspect inquiry will produce no offsetting benefits. In most cases, 
tribunals reject claims that a challenged restraint is inherently suspect, thereby confirming the 
traditional result: fullblown rule of reason analysis. Even though tribunals declare some 
restraints inherently suspect, they always reject defendants’ assertions that such restraints may 
produce cognizable economic benefits and thus invariably condemn such agreements. To be 
sure, such condemnation is less costly than condemnation after full-blown rule of reason 
                                               
13  It is worth mentioning the dissenting opinion of Judge Justice Breyer, who proposed an alternative to the 
“quick look” which consists of answering four questions, namely: 1) is the restriction really a problem? 2) 
what are the most probable anti-competitive effects that derive from it? 3) are there any pro-competitive 
effects that can balance them? 4) Do the companies involved have sufficient market power to make the 
difference? It is sufficient to answer these questions to assess whether a restriction violates the Sherman Act 
or not. 
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analysis, suggesting that application of the quick look reduces the cost of condemning such 
restraints and enhances deterrence and accuracy as well. However, any such cost savings are 
illusory, given that a straightforward application of the traditional per se test (J. PARISH, 
2016, p. 464 et seq.) - which consumes fewer resources than the quick look-would condemn 
the same restraints. Engrafting the quick look onto the traditional dichotomous approach thus 
increases the costs of enforcement and adjudication without producing any offsetting benefits. 
These costs are themselves a deadweight social loss, consuming resources that could produce 
social value elsewhere. Because defendants will bear some of these costs, the quick look also 
functions as a tax on numerous forms of concerted action that survive per se condemnation. 
This tax will induce some firms at the margin to abandon agreements that tribunals might 
conceivably deem inherently suspect, even if such agreements produce benefits for the parties 
and consumers compared to alternatives. The quick look is currently a lose-lose that imposes 
deadweight social losses and distorts underlying economic activity. The mere fact that the 
quick look, as currently structured, consumes agency, private, and judicial resources with no 
offsetting benefits does not establish that the traditional dichotomous approach is the best we 
can construct. We propose the next possible reforms of the quick look: (1) better integration of 
per se analysis with the quick look and (2) a more expansive definition of the inherently 
suspect category. Neither approach, it is shown, promises any improvement over the 
traditional dichotomous approach [...]”. (D. LIAKOPOULOS, 2016) 
In this way the investigation necessary to evaluate the legality of the restrictive 
conduct is particularly complex and long, because of the innumerable factors that the courts 
are called to take from time to time in consideration. This inevitably leads to uncertainty in 
relation to the outcome of the assessment, since the parameters used in relation to each case 
are not foreseeable: “[...] the increase focus on case facts under the rule of reason will [...] 
increase the uncertainty involved in litigation, and this uncertainty will increase the number of 
cases litigated because parties are unsure of what the outcome of a particular case will be”. 
(M. BLECHER, 1985, p. 43 et seq.) 
On the contrary, the Brown case14  is a further example of how the US courts have 
been far removed from the approach followed in the Chicago Trade of Board case. In fact, in 
the latter case, the test of reasonableness15 applied by the Supreme Court was strictly focused 
                                               
14  United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). See, C.L. SAGERS. Examples & explanations for 
antitrust. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2014. 
15  For details see: C. ISTVÁN NAGY. European Union and United States competition law: divided in unity? 
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on economic efficiency, in the case Brown the restrictive agreement was not sanctioned for 
the purposes of public protection that it pursued. Although the district court had sanctioned in 
the first instance the insight in question, the Third Circuit overturned the outcome of the 
decision in the appeal, stating that the restriction was susceptible to justification as directed to 
safeguard the right to education or otherwise, more generally, a public interest. 
Although the method most used by the courts is that of the rule of reason based on 
the economic analysis of the effects of the restriction on the market, there have been several 
cases in which the reasons why the courts justified the restrictive practices pursued objectives 
no longer only of efficiency economic, but more generally of a public nature. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, are the criticisms related to the uncertainty that revolves around the 
application of the rule of reason, given that, since there are no predefined requirements, the 
courts are free to consider the elements that they consider more relevant to their discretion. 
 
3.  THE TRANSITION TO PER SE RULE AND THE SUBSEQUENT RETURN TO 
THE RULE OF REASON 
 
Despite the fact that in the antitrust statuinitense law the need to be able to count on 
an adequate level of legal certainty is not as well felt as in Europe the criticisms made in time 
to the rule of reason have led the courts to try different ways to make the analysis of the 
conduct less expensive and more predictable. 
The recourse to per se rule (P. AREEDA, 1985, p. 28 et seq.; E.M. FOX, 1989, p. 202 et seq.; 
T.G. KRATTENMAKER, 1988, p. 166 et seq.; W.J. LIEBELER, 1985, p. 1021 et seq.; J.O. 
VON KALINOWSKI, 1963, p. 570 et seq.) has, therefore, utilitarian reasons, linked to the 
Supreme Court's need to dictate clearer and more defined guidelines for companies. (K.N. 
HYLTON, 2003, p. 116 et seq.) Faced with the vagueness of the rule of reason, the per se rule 
seemed to be the answer that saved time and money in litigation, to be an effective deterrent 
for companies and to ensure greater certainty about the outcome of decisions by the courts. 
Unlike what happens with the rule of reason, in the per se rule rule there is no room 
for the justification by the companies of the restrictive practices implemented by them. (E. 
ELHAUGE, 2016, p. 464 et seq.) The Supreme Court has, in fact, identified some agreements 
whose anti-competitive effects are so evident that there is no need to further investigate the 
reasons that led companies to conclude them.16 
                                                                                                                                                   
The rule on restrictive agreements and vertical intra-brand restaints, op. cit. 
16  According to the Supreme Court in the case: Jefferson Parish Hospital Distt. No.2 v. Hyde 26: “the rationale 
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Natural field of application of the per se rule were, therefore, the agreements that set 
prices: in the Trenton Pottiers Co. case,17 the Court affirmed that this type of agreement 
certainly has the effect of reducing at least part of the competition to the internal market and, 
for this reason, must be sanctioned without the need to ascertain its possible reasonableness. 
A few years later, this approach was also extended to all agreements that, although 
not directly fixed, had the effect of altering prices on the market18 and for this reason were 
therefore considered by the Court to be illegal in themselves. 
A further step forward in the application of the per se rule occurred with the Topco 
Associates case,19 in which the same approach reserved to price agreements was extended to 
agreements concerning the geographical distribution of the market.20 The Court has ruled that 
such a geographic market restriction is illegal in itself and can not be justified by the need to 
incentivize competition in another part of the market.21 Under the pressure of the criticism 
                                                                                                                                                   
for “per se” rule, in part, is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into the actual market conditions in situations 
where the likelihood of anti-competitive conduct is so great as to renderunjustified the costs of determining 
whether the particular case at bar involves anti-competitive conduct”. 
17  United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See also: F. ALESE. Federal antitrust and EC 
competition law analysis. New York: Routledge, 2016; J.L. CONTRERAS. The cambridge handbook of 
technical standardization law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017; W. MAREIKE. Die 
Preisbindung der zweiten Hand: Eine Newbewertung im Licht der ökonomischen, europäischen deutschen 
und schweizerischen Kartellrecths. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017, p. 173 et seq. 
18  United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940): “Any combination which tampers with price 
structures. […] under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, 
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is 
illegal per se [...]”. F. ALESE. Federal antitrust and EC competition law analysis, op. cit. 
19  United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972): (banning horizontal territorial allocations ancillary 
to otherwise legitimate joint venture); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Co., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969) 
(banning ties by firms with “economic power”); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (banning 
vertical maximum resale price maintenance), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (banning nonprice vertical restraints, including 
exclusive territories, location clauses, and customerassignment clauses, whenever title had passed from the 
manufacturer to a wholesaler or dealer), overruled by Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (banning horizontal 
maximum resale price maintenance), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984). Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (“To justify a per se 
prohibition a restraint must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects, and “lack [...] any redeeming virtue” 
(alteration in original) (first quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977); then 
quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985))); Khan, 
522 U.S. at 10 (“Some types of restraints, however, have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive 
effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se”. Nw. 
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289 (certain agreements are unlawful per se “because of their pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue” (quoting N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5)); Catalano, Inc. 
v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643, 646 n.9 (1980) (same); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 
U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (describing agreements or practices as being so “plainly anticompetitive” and so often 
“lacking [...] any redeeming virtue” as to merit per se condemnation (quoting N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. At 5)), for 
more analysis see: F. ALESE, Federal antitrust and EC competition law analysis, op. cit. 
20  United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967), defining violations of the Sherman Act even more serious than 
price agreements. F. ALESE. Federal antitrust and EC competition law analysis, op. cit. 
21  That conclusion did not agree with Mr. Burger, who, in his dissenting opinion, explained that, since the 
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also advanced by the Chicago School, the Supreme Court began to revise its orientation on 
the use of per se rule for the analysis of the agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
In particular, with the  Sylvania case,22 it is stated that the rule of reason must be the most 
used approach also in relation to the analysis of restrictive agreements of competition23. 
Reaffirming the importance of analyzing the economic benefits that could potentially derive 
from restrictive agreements, the Court thus affirmed the supremacy of the economic analysis 
of antitrust law and, therefore, of the rule of reason approach. Although in the Sylvana case 
the Supreme Court had left room for analysis with the method of the per se rule at least in 
relation to the horizontal agreements, in two successive pronunciations, on the contrary, 
further expanded the scope of the rule of reason. 
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States24 what would have 
been an agreement declared prima facie illegal by the Court,25 has instead been the subject of 
a more thorough examination of the circumstances in which it was concluded. The content of 
the agreement provided for the banning of contracting engineers to make competitive bids in 
order to protect public safety. Otherwise, in fact, there was the risk of choosing contractors 
only for the lower price offered and not on the basis of experience and quality of service. 
                                                                                                                                                   
agreement in question led to the creation of a new product, thereby increasing competition on the market, it 
should not be considered illegal in itself. 
22  Continental T.V v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Supreme Court went further and articulated the 
potential benefits of such restraints, stating: “[...] vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by 
allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These 
“redeeming virtues” are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason. 
Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete 
more effectively against other manufacturers [...]”. See in argument also: S. MARCO-COLINO. Vertical 
agreements and competition law: a comparative study of the EU and US regimes. Oxford & Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2010, p. 84 et seq.; W.J. LIEBELER. Intrabrand cartels under GTE sylvania. In: UCLA Law 
Review, 30, 1982, p. 4 et seq.; M.B. LOUIS. Restraints ancillary to joint ventures and licensing agreements: 
do sealy and topco logically survive sylvania and broadcast music? In: Virginia Law Review, 66, 1980, p. 880 
et seq.; P.R. PITOFSKY. The “Sylvania” case: antitrust analysis of non-price vertical restrictions. In: 
Columbia Law Review, 78 (1), 1978, p. 4 et seq. R.A. POSNER. The rule of reason and the economic 
approach: reflections on the sylvania decision. In: The University of Chicago Law Review, 44 (1), 1977, p. 3 
et seq.; E.F. ZELEK, W.L. STERN & T.W.  DUNFEE. A rule of reason decision model after sylvania. In: 
California Law Review, 68 (1), 1980, p. 14 et seq.  R.C. FERRARA, K.T. ABIKOFF & L. LEEDY 
GANSLER. Share holder derivative litigation: besieging the board. New York: Law Journal Press, 2013, p. 
19 et seq. 
23  According to the Court: “Departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable 
economic effect”. 
24  National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). For analysis see: A. 
EZRACHI. Research hanbook on international competition law. Edward Elgar Publishers, 2012; D.F. 
BRODER. U.S. Antitrust law and enforcement. A practice information. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010, p. 298 et seq.; R.S. MARKOVITS. Economics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. 
antitrust law, New York: Springer, 2014, p. 87 et seq. 
25  As in the case: United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See, A. EZRACHI. Research 
hanbook on international competition law, op. cit.; R.S. MARKOVITS. Economics and the interpretation 
and application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, op. cit. 
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The Court, while not applying the per se rule in this case, however, came to sanction 
the agreement following a more in-depth analysis, as the only reason given by the national 
company of engineers was not supported by data that highlight the economic efficiency. 
The transition from per se rule to the rule of reason in relation to price agreements 
was noted in the subsequent Broadcast Music  Inc. case.26 CBS has reported the violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI) because the common price 
established for the use of copyrighted products, through BMI, was the result of an agreement, 
illegal per se, concluded between the copyright holders. The Court, while clearly recognizing 
BMI's conduct as a restrictive understanding of competition,27 nevertheless considered that 
there were sufficient indications of the potential pro-competitive effects of the agreement that 
could be analyzed through the rule of reason.28 
The same desire to move from the rule-based approach to that of the rule of reason 
occurred shortly after in relation to another category typically defined as illegal in itself: the 
collective boycott.29 
                                               
26  Broadcast Music v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979): “[...] not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors 
that have an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints. 
Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, including price competition, but they are not per se illegal 
[...]”); Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20-23 (rejecting application of per se rule to a practice that was 
literally price fixing because the practice accompanied other forms of integration and “substantial lowering of 
costs” of distributing products governed by the arrangement); see also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (refusing to declare vertically imposed exclusive territories that reduce competition 
unlawful per se because of lack of information about possible redeeming virtues [...] that not all literal price 
fixing is illegal per se, it means that once a plaintiff has proved that price fixing has occurred, the defendant 
nevertheless may escape liability by proving certain facts [...] lawyers do not necessarily violate the Sherman 
Act when they form a law firm and doctors who cooperate to establish clinics are not necessarily antitrust 
felons [...]”. See A. EZRACHI. Research hanbook on international competition law, op. cit.; R. WHISH & 
D. BAILEY. Competition law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
27  The Court affirmed that: “[...] our inquiry must focus on whether the effect and (…) purpose of the practice 
are to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy-that is, whether the practice 
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease 
output”. 
28  See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The NCAA, an association that included the major US 
colleges, had imposed the maximum number of times that football teams in each school were allowed to 
appear on TV and for which compensation. Judge Stevens recognized the conduct of the NCAA as a classic 
example of horizontal restrictive agreement, which traditionally has always been considered illegal in itself. 
However, the Court decided to use the rule of reason to allow the association to justify its conduct. According 
to the NCAA the restriction was necessary in order to allow all the colleges the same opportunities to appear 
on TV and to profit from them, but this reason did not convince the Court that it nevertheless came to the 
conclusion of prohibiting the agreement. 
29  See the next cases: Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Associated 
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); 
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. 
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FrC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). For 
details see: D.F. BRODER. U.S. Antitrust law and enforcement. A practice introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012; R. JOLIET. The rule of reason in antitrust law: American, German and common 
market laws in comparative perspective. Berlin: Springer, 2014; R.D. BLAIR & D. DANIEL SOKOL. The 
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The transition to the rule of reason for the analysis of collective boycott practices 
took place in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,30 when the 
Court highlighted some possible benefits for the market in the conduct of Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers (NWS) consisting in having expelled one of its members from the 
association. Indeed, in the course of the procedure the applicant had not shown either the 
market power of NWS or that it exploited it to make access to its competitors more difficult or 
excluded. 
The same reasoning about the importance of attaching proof of the market shares of 
the company responsible for the boycott was also taken up in FTC v. Indiana Federation of 
Dentists,31 in which the Court applied the rule of reason to conclude that the refusal to provide 
x-ray machines to insurance companies to assess the extent of the claimed damages, 
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act. Even if it came to the same conclusion that would 
have come following the per se rule, the Court has made it clear that the analysis of collective 
boycotts through the per se rule is only possible in cases where companies exploit their 
market power to deter distributors or consumers from doing business with their competitors. 
In relation to the vertical agreements, the transition from per se rule to the rule of 
reason was, instead, less clear but equally significant.32 
Even the federal courts have welcomed the Supreme Court's choice to increasingly 
restrict the use of per se rule in favor of the rule of reason.33 Persuaded by the arguments of 
the Chicago School, even the federal judges shared the perplexities on such a rigid approach 
                                                                                                                                                   
oxford handbook of international antitrust economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; R. 
GREAVES. Competition law. New York: Routledge, 2017; R.S. MARKOVITS. Economcis and the 
interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, op. cit. 
30  Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co , 472 U.S. 284 (1985). T. KÄSEBERG. 
Intellectual property, antitrust and cumulative innovation in the EU and the US. Oxford & Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2012. 
31  FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). See I. SIMONSSON. Legitimacy in EU cartel 
control. Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing, 2010; R.S. MARKOVITS. Economics and the interpretation 
and application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, op. cit. 
32  See Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). J. 
DRATLER & S.M. MCJOHN. Intellectual property law. Commercial, creative and industries property. New 
York: Law Journal Press, 2018, p. 100 et seq.; J.R. VAN DEN BERGH. Comparative competition law and 
economics. Edward Elgar Publishers, 2017. R.D. BLAIR & D. DANIEL SOKOL. The oxford handbook of 
international antitrust economics, op. cit.; R.S. MARKOVITS. Economcis and the interpretation and 
application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, op. cit. 
33  Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); 
National Bancard Corp. v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.), 479 U.S. 923 (1986); Polk Bros. v. 
Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP. Fundamentals of 
antitrust law. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2011, p. 18 et seq.; R.D. BLAIR & D. DANIEL SOKOL. The 
oxford handbook of international antitrust economics, op. cit.; R.S. MARKOVITS. Economcis and the 
interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, op. cit. 
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as that of the per se rule, feeling the need to obtain from the companies explanations able to 
justify their conduct. 
The efficiency guaranteed by the per se rule, in terms of reduction of time and costs, 
as well as a significant increase in the level of predictability of the decisions taken by the 
courts in relation to certain categories of conduct, were not considered sufficient to justify the 
arbitrariness and the excessive generalization that this approach implies. Both the 
commentators of the subject and the federal and supreme courts have shown, as we have seen, 
to prefer the existence of a “gray zone” allowed by the rule of reason, in which companies 
have space to explain the reasons for their conduct, rather than a more certain and predictable 
mechanism which, however, risks sanctioning restrictions that could instead hide positive 
effects for the market. The price to pay for more predictability was therefore considered too 
high for those who have never made the flag certainty of the right. 
According to our opinion “[...] the antitrust law should seek to maximize economic 
efficiency or total welfare and ignore distributional consequences, antitrust enforcers and the 
courts should continue to apply the antitrust laws as a consumer protection regime. This 
consumer orientation has four primary grounds of support. First and foremost, American 
Congress, as revealed in the legislative histories of the antitrust laws, sought to prevent large 
firms from using their market power to raise prices and transfer wealth from consumers. In 
contrast, no one involved in the Congressional debates discussed total welfare-or probably 
even had an awareness of this academic concept. Consumer-oriented antitrust enforcement 
can be one important policy tool to contain the growing economic chasm between the rich and 
everyone else with market power by preventing wealth transfers from consumers to 
producers. Third, given how consumers often cannot organize politically on account of their 
vast numbers, the federal courts can serve as trustees for this group and protect its interests 
from better-organized producer groups. Last, just as antitrust can help consumers, consumers 
can provide needed political support for antitrust enforcement. By establishing a consumer 
constituency, antitrust enforcers can ensure the continued vitality of U.S. competition laws 
[...]”. (D. LIAKOPOULOS, 2016) 
 
4. ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND THE RESTRICTIONS BY OBJECT AND EFFECT 
  
Article 101 TFUE (A. JONES & B. SUFRIN, 2014, p. 122 et seq.; N. PETIT, 2013, p. 178 
et seq.; R. WHISH & D. BAILEY, 2012, p. 83 et seq.)  is divided into three paragraphs, the 
first of which prohibits all agreements between companies operating at the same level of the 
 
 
 
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 13 – n. 2 – p. 286-334 – Jul./Dez. 2018 
 
301 
production or distribution chain (horizontal agreements) or at different levels (vertical agree-
ments), ii) decisions by business associations and iii) concerted practices which may affect 
trade between EU countries and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition. 
In addition to imposing the ban described above, the first paragraph of art. 101 TFEU lists 
some examples of anti-competitive conduct deemed prohibited because they are contrary to 
competition law.34 It is good to specify that, being a merely illustrative list, nothing excludes 
that a conduct that does not fall within those expressly mentioned can be considered contrary 
to art. 101.1 TFEU. (R. WHISH, D. BAILEY, 2012, p. 83 et seq.) The law continues by 
declaring the nullity “of full right” of any agreement, decision or concerted practice 
concluded in violation of art. 101.1 TFEU. This sanction operates automatically and without a 
specific EC decision to that effect being required. The direct applicability of art. 101 TFEU 
means that the nullity can also be declared by the national authorities responsible for the 
protection of competition. This is an absolute nullity that deprives the agreement or the 
decision, even in relation to third parties, for any length of time for which the violation has 
continued. However, the european jurisprudence has clarified that the nullity extends only to 
the clauses that violate art. 101.1 TFEU,35 the other parts of the agreement remaining valid 
and effective insofar as such possibility is provided for under national law.36 
There is the possibility that the conduct prohibited under the first paragraph of art. 101.1 
TFEU are exempted from this prohibition and, consequently, from the penalty of nullity. 
Paragraph 3 of the provision in question provides, in fact, an exemption for agreements or 
decisions restricting competition which comply with the following requirements: (i) 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of products or to promoting technical or 
economic progress; ii) reserve a fair share of the resulting profit for users; iii) avoid imposing 
restrictions on the undertakings concerned which are not indispensable for achieving these 
objectives; (iv) do not give these companies the possibility of eliminating competition in 
                                               
34  This concerns in particular those agreements or concerted practices aimed at: “a) directly or indirectly fixing 
purchase or selling prices or other transaction conditions; b) limit or control production, outlets, technical 
development or investments; c) to share markets or sources of supply; d) apply, in commercial relations with 
other contractors, dissimilar conditions for equivalent services, so as to determine for them a disadvantage in 
competition; e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other contractors of 
supplementary services which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the subject of the contracts themselves [...]”. 
35  CJEU, C-56/65, Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v. Société Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.) of 30 
May 1966, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, ECR 00262. 
36  CJEU, 319/82, Société de Vente de Ciments et Bétons de l'Est SA v. Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH und Co. KG. 
Of 14 December 1983, ECLI:EU:C:1983:374, I-04173. 
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respect of a substantial part of the products in question. These requirements are cumulative, so 
if even one of them is not respected, the agreement or concerted practice can not be exempted 
from the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1.37 These conditions must also persist for the 
duration of the agreement. 
Before the entry into force of Regulation no. 1/200338 the EC had exclusive jurisdiction 
over the application of art. 101.3 TFEU: the legislation previously envisaged the obligation 
for the companies concerned to avail themselves of the exemption in question to notify the 
EC agreement for the latter to decide on its applicability.39 Following the reform, this 
notification system has been abolished, making the provision referred to in paragraph 3 
become a real legal exception that companies can assert in proceedings for violation of art. 
101.1 TFEU. Art. 2 of Regolation n. 1/2003 clarifies that the burden of proving the fulfillment 
of the requirements set out in paragraph 3 lies with the companies that intend to use them. As 
can be seen from the text of the standard, an agreement or concerted practice can prevent, 
restrict or distort competition because of their object or their effect. These requirements are 
                                               
37  Communication from the Commission-Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty published 
in the Official Journal of 27.4.2004, C 101, p. 97, par. 42; see, T-213/00, CMA GCM and others v. European 
Commission of 19 March 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:76, II-00913. 
38  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25. See in particular: Communication 
from the Commission-Ten years of antitrust enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and future 
perspectives (COM(2014) 453, 9.7.2014); Commission staff working Document SWD (2014) 230-Ten years 
of antitrust enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 (SWD(2014) 230/2, 9.7.2014; Commission staff working 
Document SWD (2014) 231-Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States' competition 
authorities: Institutional and procedural issues (SWD(2014) 231/2). For details and analysis see. P.J.W. 
WOUTER, Ten years of Regulation 1/2003-A retrospective, in Journal of European Competition Law and 
Practice, 4, 2013. In the case C-17/10, Toshiba of 14 February 2012, (ECLI:EU:C:2012:552, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases), both Advocate General Kokott and the CJEU have stated, inter alia, that 
Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 contains a rule of procedure such that the national competition authorities 
are automatically deprived of their competences to apply Article 101 or 102 TFEU as soon as the EC initiates 
proceedings for the adoption of a decision under the Regulation 1/2003. This does not definitively preclude 
further proceedings in the application of national competition law. In the case C-360/09, Pfleiderer v. 
Bundeskartellamt of 14 June 2011, (ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, published in the electronic Reports of the cases) 
the CJEU interpreted artt. 11 and 12 of Regulation 1/2003 in the context of national proceedings concerning 
access to the file of a proceeding on the imposition of a fine (including the leniency procedure documents) 
which was sought in order to prepare a civil action for damages in front of a German court. The CJEU stated 
that such access might be granted to: “[...] a person who has been adversely affected by an infringement of 
European Union competition law and is seeking to obtain damages” but onthe basis of national law, with due 
consideration for the “interests protected by European Union law”. This last judgment is of particular interest 
for the problem analysed in this article, as it clearly allows the EU Member States to retain their procedural 
provisions when applying Regulation 1/2003, even if it implies a different level of protection of the 
undertakings concerned. In the same spirit we notice also the case: C-536/11, Donau Chemie and others of 6 
June 2013, (ECLI:EU:C:2013:366, published in the electronic Reports of the cases). For details see also: I. 
VANDENBORRE. European Union competition law proedural isues. In: Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, 4 (6), 2013, p. 508 et seq.; M. MARQUIS, R. CISOTTA (a cura di). Litigation and 
arbitration in EU competition law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015. 
39  Article 4.1 of the Council Regulation (EEC) n. 17/1962: First regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty. 
 
 
 
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 13 – n. 2 – p. 286-334 – Jul./Dez. 2018 
 
303 
alternative to each other and should therefore be considered separately. In fact, established 
case law established that the concrete effects should be examined only if the agreement does 
not have the object of restricting competition.40 
This approach has also been confirmed by the EC which, in paragraph 20 of the Gui-
delines on the application of article 81 (3) of the Treaty, states that: “once it has been esta-
blished that an agreement has the object of restricting competition, it is not necessary to take 
account of its concrete effects. In other words, for the purpose of applying article 81 (1), it is 
not necessary to demonstrate the existence of anti-competitive effects if the agreement has as 
its object a restriction of competition”.41 The Communication then goes on to provide, in pa-
ragraph 21, the definition of restrictions by object, which are identified as those “which by 
their very nature can restrict competition. These are restrictions which, in the light of the ob-
jectives of the Community competition rules, have such a high potential to produce adverse 
effects on competition that it is unnecessary for the purposes of article 81 (1) to demonstrate 
the existence of specific effects on the market”. (J. TILLOTSON & N. FOSTER, 2013; M. 
HORSPOOL & M. HUMPHREYS, 2012, p. 552 et seq.) 
Similarly to what has been seen regarding the application of the per se rule, the 
Community jurisprudence has also identified some types of agreements considered restrictive 
by object, which can not therefore be justified by the analysis of the economic context in 
which they were concluded.42 
In the European Night Services sentence43 the Tribunal of First Instance (General 
Court (GC) after Lisbon), after stating that the assessment of an agreement must take into 
                                               
40  CJEU, C-56/65, Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v. Société Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.) of 30 
May 1966, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, ECR 00262; C-56 and 58/64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and 
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of 13 July 1966, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, ECR 00458; C-277/87, 
Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici v. Commission of 11 January 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:363, I-00045; C-234/89, 
Sterios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG of 28 February 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91, I-00935; C-219/95 P, 
Ferriere Nord v. Commission of 17 July 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:375, I-04411; C-49/92 P, Commission v. 
Anic Partecipazioni of 8 July 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, ECR I-04125; T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. 
Commission of 23 October 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:281, II-4653. 
41  For details see:  C. BARNARD, S. PEERS. European Union law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 
586 et seq.; N. FOSTER. European Union law directions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. A. THIES. 
International trade disputes and European Union liability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
D.A.O. EDWARD & R. LANE. Edward and Lane on European Union law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishers, 2013; C. NOWAK. Europarecht nach Lissabon. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011. D. CHALMERS; 
G. DAVIES & G. MONTI. European Union law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
42  See in argument the joined cases T-67, T-68, T-71 and T-78/00, JFE Engineering v. Commission of 8 July 
2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:221, II-02501. 
43  See, joined cases T-374, T-375, T-384 and T-388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS), Eurostar (UK) 
Ltd,, Union internationale des chemins de fer (UIC), NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS) and Société 
nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) v. Commission of the European Communities of 15 September 
1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:198, II-03141. 
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account the specific context in which it produces its effects,44 identified in the horizontal 
agreements that they set prices45  and in the decisions that divide the market46 two examples 
of manifest restrictions of competition which, as such, can not be justified in the context in 
which they were concluded. 
A further case considered by the CJEU as a restriction by object is that of vertical 
agreements which prohibit exportation. The CJEU reached that conclusion in the General 
Motors decision47 in which it was asked to judge an agreement concerning the application by 
a motor vehicle supplier, in the context of concession contracts, of a measure that excluded 
export sales from the system of premiums granted to dealers. On that occasion, the European 
judge also clarified that an agreement may have a restrictive object even if it does not have as 
its sole objective a restriction of competition, but also pursues the attainment of other 
legitimate objectives. 
Still in relation to vertical agreements, in particular those that set resale prices 
between the supplier and the distributor,48  the CJEU has recently confirmed that even if 
vertical agreements are often, by their nature, less harmful to competition than horizontal 
                                               
44  In case CRAM and Rheinzink joined cases 29 and 30/83, Compagnie royale astimenne des mines SA e 
Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities of 28 March 1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:130, I-
01679, the CJEU has clarified, with regard to the assessment of the restrictive agreements by object, that: “To 
determine whether an agreement has the object of restricting competition it is not necessary to ascertain 
which of the two contractors has taken the initiative to include this or that clause, or to check whether the 
parties had a common intention at the time the agreement was signed. 
45  See ex multis: T-224/00, Archer Daniels Midland v. Commission of 9 July 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:195, II-
2597; joined cases T-202, T-204 and T-207/98, Tate & Lyle v. Commission of 12 July 2001, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:185, II-2035; T-141/94, Thyssen Stahl A.G. v. Commission of 11 March 1999, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:48, II-00347; T-148/89, Trèfilunion v. Commission of 6 April 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:68, 
II-01063. Price-fixing agreements are also classed as restrictions by the Commission which, in the 
aforementioned Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, states in paragraph 20 that: 
“Restrictions by object, such as the fixing of prices and the distribution of the market, provoke reductions in 
production and price increases, leading to a poor allocation of resources, as the goods and services requested 
by consumers are not produced. These restrictions also lead to a reduction in the well-being of consumers, 
who have to pay a higher price for the goods and services in question. 
46  In the same spirit see the decisions from the European Commission of 24 January 2007, case 
COMP/F/38.899-Gas Insulated Switchgear; of 5 December 2001, case COMP/37.800/F3-Luxemburg 
Brewers; Continental Can Company (IV/26 811) (1972) OJ L7/25 (8 January 1972); Distillers Company 
Limited (IV.28.282) (1978) OJ L50/16 (22 February 1978); Spain Pharma (IV/37.121/F3), BAI 
(IV/37.138/F3) and EAEPC (IV/37.380/F3) (2001) OJ L302/1 (17 November 2001); Grundig Verkaufs-
GmbH (63/566/EEC) (1964) OJ L161/2545 (20 October 1964); Konica (IV/31.502) (1988) OJ L78/34 (23 
March 1988); Mercedes-Benz (COMP/36.264) (2002) OJ L257/1 (25 September 2002); Night Services 
(IV/34.600) (1994) OJ L259/20 (7 October 1994); PO Video Games (COMP/35.587), PO Nintendo 
Distribution (COMP/37.706) and Omega-Nintendo (COMP/36.231) (2003) OJ L255/33 (8 October 2003); 
SABA (IV/847) (1976) OJ L28/19 (3 February 1976); Virgin/British Airways (IV/D2/34.780) (2000) OJ 
L10/1 (4 February 2000) and the case T-30/91, Solvay v. Commission of 29 June 1995, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:115, II-01775. 
47  CJEU, C-551/03 P,  General  Motors v. Commission of 6 April 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:229, I-03173. 
48 CJEU, C-243/83, SA Binon Cie v. Sa Agence et messageries de la presse of 3 July 1985, 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:284, ECR 02015. 
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agreements, they too may, under certain circumstances, have a particularly high restrictive 
potential.49 
In addition to the categories of agreements identified by the jurisprudence, although 
there is no EC communication containing an exhaustive list of agreements restricting 
competition by object, (D. BAILEY, 2012, p. 560 et seq.) they are generally considered to be 
those listed in the exemption regulations50 or in the EC guidelines. Examples of this are the 
“Guidelines on the applicability of article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements”, 
(L. MORITZ, 2013, p. 93 et seq.) which, in paragraph 74, state that “the exchanges of 
information made by competitors on individualized data on prices or quantities future should 
[...] be considered a restriction of competition by object [...]”.51 
On the other hand, if an agreement does not have the object of restricting 
competition, we proceed to assess whether it may have anti-competitive effects in violation of 
art. 101.1 TFEU. (L. MORITZ, 2013, p. 93 et seq.) According to the EC, for an agreement to 
produce restrictive effects, “it must affect actual or potential competition to such an extent 
that, with reasonable probability, adverse effects on prices, production, innovation or the 
variety or quality of goods can be expected, and services offered on the relevant market”.52 
In order to establish whether an agreement has an anti-competitive effect or not, it is 
necessary to examine it in the legal and economic context in which it is to be applied, with the 
relevant market definition being of primary importance,53 since a restriction of competition 
can have a more or less negative depending on whether they are agreements between 
competitors or non-competitors. (L. MORITZ, 2013, p. 93 et seq.) In speciem, in the O2 
ruling, the european judge stressed that the analysis of the anti-competitive effects of the 
agreements must also take into account how the competition took place in the absence of the 
contested cartel. 
                                               
49  CJEU, C-56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission of 13 July 1966, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, ECR 
00429; C-243/83, Binon v. AMP of 3 July 1985, ECLI:EU:C:1985:284, ECR 02015; C-32/11, Allianz 
Hungária Biztosító Zrt. And others v. Gazdasági Versenyhivatal of 14 March 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:160, 
published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
50  See, for example, the art. 4 of the Regulation (EC) no. 772/2004 of the Commission of 27 April 2004 on the 
application of Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ of 
27.4.2004, L 123, p. 11. 
51  Communication from the Commission-Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, op. cit. 
52  Communication from the Commission-Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements, OJ of 14.1.2001, C 11/1 
53  Communication from the Commission-Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty published 
in the OJ of 27.4.2004, C 101, p. 97, par. 24. 
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With specific regard to vertical agreements, in the Delimitis decision54 the CJEU 
introduced the so-called parallel network theory: as suggested by the CJEU, the effects of an 
agreement, as well as individually, should also be examined in relation to other similar 
agreements already existing on the market, so as to assess whether this network of agreements 
allows access to the market by a new entrant or, on the contrary, prevent it. (L. MORITZ, 
2013, p. 93 et seq.)  In the latter case, it will be necessary to ascertain more specifically how 
much the agreement challenged to create this barrier to access the market contributes.55 
Further, in a line of cases frequently referred to in the EU as “ancillary restraints 
cases” the EU Courts, as explained in Remia & Nutricia,56, 57 consider what the state of 
competition would be if certain allegedly restrictive clauses did not exist. If it is found that 
individual restraints contained in a non-restrictive transaction are objectively necessary for, 
directly related and proportionate to it-i.e. without it the transaction (in that case the sale of a 
business together with its goodwill) would be unlikely to be implemented or proceed-it holds 
that they “are free of the prohibition of article 101(1) TFUE”.58 The restraints, even if they do 
restrict competition, fall outside article 101(1) TFUE as, without them, the beneficial 
transaction would not take place. If the clauses are not found to be ancillary, however, it 
seems that they are not prohibited automatically but only if established to restrict competition-
whether by object or effect (see also Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard 
Schillgallis59 where the CJEU made it clear that restraints in the franchising agreement which 
were not considered to be ancillary to it had to be scrutinised to see if they restricted 
competition). It is clear, nonetheless, that each involve both some form of characterization 
exercise and some form of truncated analysis and burden shifting in the identification of 
restrictions of competition. The ancillary restraint cases assess first whether the restraints 
seem necessary to the legitimate agreement/objective-if this seems plausible they are not 
                                               
54  See, T-328/03, O2 (Germany) v. Commission of 2 May 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:116, II-01231. This same 
concept was also expressed by the Court of Justice in the aforementioned General Motors decision, where it 
was stated that, in order to decide on the legitimacy of the cartel, it is necessary to examine the competitive 
situation on the market for the supply of motor vehicles in the hypothesis export sales had not been excluded 
from the premium policy. 
55  CJEU, C-235/89, Delimitis, op. cit. 
56  CJEU, C-42/84, Remia v. Commission of 11 July 1985, ECLI:EU:C:1985:327, ECR 02545. 
57  CJEU, C-445/15 Nutricia of 5 October 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:106, not published. 
58  In the same spirit, rectius orientation see also: CJEU, order, C-516/18, Sun Express Deutschland of 2 August 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018, not published; order C-411/18P, Romantik Hotels & Restaurants v. EUIPO of 3 
August 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:823, published in the electronic reports of the cases; order C-340/18, EK and 
others of 3 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:577, not published. 
59  CJEU, C-161/84, Pronuptia Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis of 28 
January 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:41, I-00353, par. 24; 
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considered to be restrictive of competition by object. The restraints are tested to see if they are 
ancillary. If they are necessary, they fall outside of article 101(1) TFUE altogether-it seems to 
be assumed that the legitimate objective pursued outweighs any restrictions which flow from 
the restraints identified. If they are not ancillary, a fuller analysis of the agreement’s restrictive 
effects (under article 101(1)) TFUE and countervailing benefits (under article 101(3)) TFUE60 
is required. In objective necessity cases, in contrast, the objective necessity function seems to 
perform only a combined classification and truncated analysis function. If the restraints are 
not objectively necessary they are assumed to restrict competition (they are restrictive of 
competition by object). If they are objectively necessary however they do not restrict 
competition (by object or effect). 
 
5.  THE DEBATE ON ART. 101 AS CODIFICATION OF THE PER SE RULE AND OF 
THE RULE OF REASON 
 
To the approaches per se rule and rule of reason, the law of the European Union 
contrasts therefore the categories of the so-called “by object” or “by effect” restrictions of 
competition. (E. FOX , 2008, p. 111 et seq.) 
The debate on the contrast between these different methods has mainly developed 
around two issues: 1) if it is possible to identify in paragraph 1 of art. 101 a prohibition on the 
part of restrictive competition agreements; 2) if paragraph 3 of art. 101 represents a 
codification of the rule of reason. Regarding the first question, doubts about the possibility of 
classifying as per se the restrictions on competition prohibited under article 101.1 were born 
as a result of some rulings by CJEU61 and EC62  in which the ban is applied almost 
automatically and uncritically. Particularly representative of this approach is the Volkswagen 
judgment,63  where the European judge, in evaluating an agreement to geographically share 
the market, has decided to sanction the car manufacturer for having adopted measures 
concerning the partitioning of the market, through an all similar to per se rule, stating that 
“such measures were in themselves such as to affect trade between Member States pursuant to 
                                               
60  As we can see in particular in the next cases: CJEU, C-326/18 P, Safe Skies v. EUIPO of 4 October 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:800; C-230/16, Coty Germany of 26 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:603; C-16/16 P, Belgium 
v. Commission of 12 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:959 and T-491/07 RENV, CB v. Commission of 30 
June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:379, all the above cases published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
61 See, T-19/91, Société d'hygiène dermatologique de Vichy v. Commission of 27 February 1992, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:21, II-00415. 
62  Decision of the European Commission of 16 December 1991, IV/33.242, Yves Saint Laurent pubblicata in 
GU L12 of 18 January 1992, p. 14. 
63  See, T-62/98, Volkswagen AG v. European Commission of 6 July 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:180,  II-02707. 
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art. 85, n. 1, of the Treaty and that therefore the EC, in carrying out its investigation, “was not 
required to investigate the concrete effects of these measures on the game of competition 
within the common market”.64 
On the other hand, on other occasions the european judge, in assessing the anti-
competitive nature of the cases listed in the list referred to in paragraph 1, instead of declaring 
the illegality tout court, recognized the need to carry out an analysis of the agreements taking 
into account the context in which they were concluded, taking into account different factors 
each time in order to assess the possible restrictive scope of competition.65 In Glaxo 
sentence,66 after confirming that agreements to restrict parallel trade or to compartmentalize 
the common market must in principle be regarded as intended to prevent competition, the GC 
adds that, however, the mere fact that an agreement aims to restrict parallel trade is not 
enough to conclude in the sense of a violation of article 81, n. 1, CE. The decision of the EC, 
which sanctioned the conduct of the pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, was declared 
flawed and, in the end, annulled precisely because it did not sufficiently take into account the 
positive effects that these conditions of sale had on the ability to invest in innovation and 
research of the company. 
In the same spirit we recall the Société Technique Minière sentence67 where the 
CJEU has established that the contract that contains a clause granting an exclusive right of 
sale within a given area “does not automatically fall under the prohibition set forth in art. 81 
n. 1”, (L. MORITZ, 2013, p. 93 et seq.) since it is also necessary to analyze the relevant legal 
and economic context. 
                                               
64  CJEU, joined cases C-32/78 and from 36/78 at 82/78, BMW Belgium v. Commission of 12 July 1979, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:191,  ECR 02435, par. 32. 
65  CJEU, C-32/11, Allianz Hungària Biztosìtò and others of 13 March 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:160, published 
in the eelctronic reports of the cases. 
66 See, T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission of 27 September 2006, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:265, II-02969. For details see: E. DIENY. Appréciation au regard du droit communautaire 
de la concurrence d'un accord visant à réduire le commerce parallèle des médicaments. In: La Semaine 
juridique-entreprise et affaires, 2006, p. 2151 et seq. R. ECCLES. Parallel exports in the pharmaceuticals 
sector: Take nothing for granted. In: European Competition Law Review, 28, 2007, p. 134 et seq. L. IDOT. 
Commerce parallèle de médicaments et spécificité du marché pharmaceutique. In: Europe, 2006, n. 326, p. 
28 et seq. V. JUNOD. An end to parallel imports of medicines? Comments on the judgment of the Court of 
First Instance in GlaxoWellcome. In: World Competition, 30, 2007, p. 292 et seq. C. ROBIN. Accords de 
distribution. In: Revue Lamy de la Concurrence: droit, économie, régulation, 10, 2007, p. 22 et seq. M. VAN 
DER WOUDE. Le TPI annule la décision de la Commission rejetant une demande d'exemption pour un 
système de prix différenciés en fonction de la destination des produits pharmaceutiques. In: Concurrences: 
Revue des Droits de la Concurrence, 4, 2006, p. 64 et seq. F. ZIVY. Délimitation des preuves admissibles en 
justice à l'appui d'une demande d'annulation d'une décision d'application de l'article 81 CE. In: Concurrences: 
Revue des Droits de la Concurrence, 4, 2006, p. 116 et seq. 
67 CJEU, C-56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Machinenbau Ulm GmbH of  30 June 1966, 
ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, ECR 00377. 
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There are, then, cases in which the CJEU did not hesitate to exclude the application 
of competition law by virtue of principles or policies, external to the market, and therefore to 
the case under evaluation, to be considered prevalent in  comparison between principles with 
circular contents. The most significant case, which certainly can not be traced back to the rule 
of reason, is offered by the Albany International decision,68 where the CJEU decided not to 
sanction an agreement, stipulated in the form of a collective agreement, which established a 
supplementary pension scheme, the registration to which it could be made compulsory by the 
public authorities, since this scheme, as a whole, aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of 
pension to all workers in the sector concerned and directly contributed, therefore, to 
improving one of the working conditions of the employees. Also in the Wouters decision69  
the CJEU declared that not all agreements that restrict the freedom of action of the parties 
necessarily violate art. 101 TFEU (at the time, article 81 EC), since it must take into account 
the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings in question was 
adopted or its effects and, more particularly, its objectives, which in this case they concerned 
the proper exercise of the profession of lawyer. 
This so flexible approach of CJEU in judging some of the cases listed in paragraph 1 
has led some to rule out the possibility of talking about a prohibition per se and, at the same 
time, to consider that there is room to recognize within art. 101 an analysis in terms of rule of 
reason.70 
The analysis of the market within which the agreement operates, which characterizes 
the method of the rule of reason, has in fact been used as a criterion for evaluating a contract 
for the supply of beer from the CJEU in the aforementioned Delimitis sentence. (D. 
HILDEBRAND, 2002, p. 2018 et seq.) According to some authors, the fact that factors such 
as the number of competing producers on the market, the level of saturation of the same and 
the degree of consumer loyalty have been taken into consideration, represents a case of 
application of the rule of reason. There are those who have excluded this reading, arguing that 
                                               
68   CJEU, C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie of 21 
September 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:430, I-05751. 
69  CJEU, C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. 
Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten of 19 February 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98, I-
01577. 
70  In general, the Court of First Instance (General Court) and the CJEU gave more space to the economic 
analysis of the investigations, demanding from the Commission more convincing arguments not only in 
relation to the analysis of restrictive agreements, but also when assessing the abuses of dominant position 
(see, T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Commission of the European communities of 6 June 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:192, II-02585) and concentrations (T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission of the 
European Communities of 25 October 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:264, II-04519). 
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the only place where it is possible to carry out a complete economic analysis within art. 101 is 
paragraph 3. The equation of art. 101.3 TFEU to the US rule of reason has attracted numerous 
criticisms. First of all, the different origin was highlighted, in the first normative case and in 
the second case law, of the two methods. Secondly, it was stressed that while the rule of 
reason is used in a case-by-case analysis of the restrictions, paragraph 3 refers to whole 
categories of agreements. Finally, it has been observed that, unlike what happens with the rule 
of reason, paragraph 3 makes it possible to carry out evaluations not only of an economic but 
also of political-social nature. 
Overall we could say that the application of article 101(1) TFEU to agreements 
restricting parallel trade focused, by and large, on cases where EU competition law did not 
interfere with the exploitation of intellectual property rights. (L. MORITZ, 2013, p. 93 et seq.) 
The majority of such cases concerned instances where rights were already exhausted and thus 
where the agreements remained outside the substantive and geographic scope of the 
intellectual property right inquestion. Ongoing developments will contribute to the 
clarification of the aspects of the case law that remain controversial, or unclear. 
 
6.  A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF THE INFLUENCE OF US THEORIES ON ART. 101 
TFUE 
 
The decisions taken respectively by the US Supreme Court in the Actavis case71 and 
                                               
71  Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., et al, 570 U.S (2013): (“[...] contending that the challenged 
restraint was inherently suspect, in so far as it was “facially anticompetitive,” and should thus be considered 
“presumptively unlawful”); Brief for Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 12, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (arguing that the challenged restraint should be treated as prima 
facie anticompetitive).Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237-2238 (rejecting the contention by the FTC and several 
amici curiae briefs that reverse-patent settlements are inherently suspect); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 
7 n.3 (2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that restraint was properly subject to a quick look analysis); Cal. 
Dental Assoc’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-781 (1999) (rejecting contention that challenged restraint was 
inherently suspect and therefore subject to quick look analysis); Cal. Dental Assoc’n, 526 U.S. At 782-794 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that the restraints in question were inherently suspect); California ex rel. 
Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1137-1139 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument 
that restraint was properly subject to quick look); California ex rel. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1144-1162 (Reinhardt, 
J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority’s determination); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 
F.3d 820, 829-832 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on plaintiff’s quick 
look theory); MLB Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
contention that challenged restraints were properly subject to quick look); MLB Props., Inc., 542 F.3d at 337 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (rejecting plaintiff’s quick look argument on different grounds); N. Tex. 
Physicians Specialty v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 360-362 (5th Cir. 2008) (articulating standards governing quick 
look analysis); N. Tex. Physicians Specialty, 528 F.3d at 363-368 (examining challenged restraint and finding 
it inherently suspect); Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to subject 
exclusive dealing arrangement to quick look); Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 
955, 959-961 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that challenged restraint was subject to quick look 
analysis); Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting lower 
court’s determination that challenged restraint was subject to quick look); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
 
 
 
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 13 – n. 2 – p. 286-334 – Jul./Dez. 2018 
 
311 
by the EC in the Lundbeck case.72 
contributed to the debate on the influence of the American theories on art. 101 
TFUE. (A. ITALIANER, 2013, p. 4 et seq.) In fact, the logical process that characterizes these 
two pronunciations appears very similar to the point that they have reopened the debate on the 
influence that the doctrines of the rule of reason and per se rule have had on art. 101 TFEU. 
The Actavis case,73  decided by the Supreme Court of June 2013, focused on the agreement 
                                                                                                                                                   
79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996) (declining to subject exclusive dealing arrangement to a quick look 
analysis); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting previous 
determination that quick look applied and instead holding that proof of market power was necessary to 
establish a prima facie case); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(same); Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 571-573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s contention that sports league restraint should be subject to a quick look); Holmes Prods. 
Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 33-34 (D. Mass. 1997) (declining to subject exclusive 
distribution agreement to quick look analysis); see also Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824-827 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (declining to determine, after briefing and argument, whether to subject challenged restraints to a 
quick look).Supreme Court’s NCAA conclusion that all restraints in such networks require rule of reason 
treatment because joint activity is needed to deliver product at all. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (holding “extensive market and cross-elasticity analysis is not necessarily required” under an 
abbreviated analysis but refusing to apply an abbreviated analysis because of lack of experience with the 
product market in question); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming application of a 
“quick look” rule of reason analysis); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 
1992) (applying a “‘quick look’ version of the Rule of Reason” to an agreement among owners of NBA 
teams limiting broadcast rights to NBA games); United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 321 (2d Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016) (noting the need to balance is an element of rule of reason cases); 
ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 273 (3d Cir. 2012) (suggesting that creation of price-cost tests 
in exclusive discounting cases was an effort at “balancing of the procompetitive justifications of above-cost 
pricing against its anticompetitive effects”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“[...] Courts routinely apply a [...] balancing approach” requiring plaintiff to “demonstrate that the 
anticompetitive harm [...] outweighs the procompetitive benefit”); Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 
781, 789 (9th Cir. 1996) (rule of reason requires a showing that “the restraint is unreasonable as determined 
by balancingthe restraint and any justifications or pro-competitive effects of the restraint”); see also Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486-487 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the 
difference between the rule of reason and the per se rule is that the former requires balancing). Contra United 
States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2016); Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017) 
(Second Circuit’s requirement of “net harm” in a case involving a two-sided market would require balancing 
as early as plaintiff’s prima facie case). Accoridng to our opinion after studied the cases above we could say 
that a better way to view balancing is as a last resort when the defendant has offered a procompetitive 
explanation for a prima facie anticompetitive restraint, but no less restrictive alternative has been shown. At 
that point the basic burden-shifting framework has gone as far as it can. The court must then determine 
whether the anticompetitive effects made out in the prima facie case are sufficiently offset by the proffered 
defense. Even here, a hard look at the quality of the evidence is important. The court needs to make sure that 
the market is well defined, with convincing evidence of power, and that the threat of higher prices or 
anticompetitive exclusion is clear. The same thing is true of evidentiary support for the offered justification. 
Hopefully, few cases will survive this hard look and still require balancing, although the possibility cannot be 
excluded. For analysis see also: J.W. MARKHAM. Sailing a sea of doubt: A critique of the rule of reason in 
U.S. antitrust Law. In: Fordham Journal of Corporate & Finance Law, 17, 2012, p. 594 et seq. J.L. 
CONTRERAS. The cambridge handbook of technical standardization law, op. cit.; R.S. MARKOVITS, 
Economcis and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, op. cit. 
72  Decision of the European Commission of 19 June 2013, Lundbeck, COMP/AT. 39.226. 
73  See H. HOVENKAMP. Anticompetitive patent settlements and the Supreme Court's Actavis decision. In: 
Minnesota Journal of Law Sciences & Techology, 15, 2014, p. 6 et seq. K.R. O'ROURKE; J. SALLET K. 
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between several generators manufacturers, including Actavis (then Watson Pharmaceuticals), 
who undertook not to sell the generic version of a drug called AndroGel until August 2015. 
The Supreme Court, in analyzing the contested sentence, instead considered that the judgment 
of the minor courts, which would have omitted to examine the anti-competitive effects, was 
unacceptable. According to the Supreme Court, the abandonment of the rule of reason in favor 
of an assumption-based analysis can, in fact, only be justified when even an observer with 
elementary knowledge of economics can conclude that the agreement in question would have 
anticompetitive effects on the market. Given the complexity of the case under consideration, 
in which the interests protected by federal antitrust rules had to be balanced with those 
protected by patent laws, the Supreme Court decided to refer the matter back to the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit to proceed to a more in-depth evaluation, applying 
the rule of reason. 
Just two days after the ruling of Supreme Court, the EC has sanctioned the 
pharmaceutical company Lundbeck and other companies producing generic drugs for an 
agreement similar to that of the newly described Actavis case. (W. CHOI; B. DEN UYL & M. 
HUGHES, 2014, p. 46 et seq.; O. ZAFAR, 2014, p. 208 et seq.) Also on this occasion, in fact, 
the pharmaceutical company that holds the patent for an antipressive, Citalopram, has signed 
an agreement with some generators to prevent them from entering the market with the generic 
version of the drug in exchange for the payment of around 10 million euros. In order to 
evaluate the anti-competitive potential of the agreement among pharmaceutical companies, 
the EC has taken into consideration the same factors on the basis of which the Supreme Court 
has adopted its decision, namely: i) the ability of producers of generic being potential 
competitors of Lundbeck; ii) the limit imposed on producers not to enter the market for the 
duration of the agreement; iii) the loss of incentives for producers to support the necessary 
efforts, in terms of research and development, to enter the market autonomously, having been 
shown that the sum paid by Lundbeck already corresponded to the potential gain that 
generators would have had successfully entering the market. (O. ZAFAR, 2014, p. 208 et 
seq.) 
As in the Actavis case, the complexity of the story has also led the EC to consider an 
analysis that takes into account the legal and economic context, and therefore refuses to 
                                                                                                                                                   
ROBSON & FTC V. Actavis: Reconciling conflicts in rule of reason. In: LexisNexis Advance 7/2013. R. A. 
SAMP. The role of State antitrust law in the aftermath of Actavis. In: Minnesota Journal of Law Sciences & 
Techology, 15, 2014, p. 152 et seq. 
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automatically bring the agreement in question to a restriction by object pursuant to art. 101.1 
TFEU. (W. CHOI, B. DEN UYL, M. HUGHES, 2014, p. 46 et seq.)  
 
7.  OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXISTENCE OF A EUROPEAN RULE OF REASON IN 
RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
It is considered necessary to share the approach of EC74 and CJEU,75 which have 
denied on several occasions the equation between art. 101 par. 3 and the rule of reason. If, in 
fact it is true that, the Community jurisprudence has shown a flexibility in the application of 
art. 101 such as to allow the justification of apparently anti-competitive agreements, such 
flexibility can not be interpreted as a legitimation of the existence of a rule of reasonableness 
in Community competition law. The aforementioned approach fits rather into an assessment 
that goes beyond the mere economic analysis of the effects, also including aspects of a public 
nature unknown to the traditional US rule of reason. 
With respect to the doctrine, in light of the Actavis and Lundbeck judgments, it is 
necessary to recognize the validity of the arguments of those (M. MARQUIS, 2007, p. 44 et 
seq.; B. ROBERTSON, 2007, p. 262 et seq.; E. STEINDORFF, 1984, p. 649 et seq.) who 
                                               
74  In the White Paper on the modernization of the rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty, published in the Official Journal no. C 132 of 12/05/1999 p. 0001, the Commission declares that it 
does not see in the rule of reason a solution to the enforcement problems linked to art. 85 EC. Having 
introduced an assessment of the pro and anti-competitive aspects does not mean that we can go further, since 
“more systematically, within the framework of Article 85 (1), an analysis of the pro- and anti-competitive 
aspects of a restrictive understanding would in fact lead to the deletion of its content paragraph 3 of the same 
article and only a revision of the treaty could introduce such a change. It would be at least paradoxical to 
deprive Article 85 (3) of its substance, where that provision actually contains all the elements of a “principle 
of reasonableness”. 
75  See, T-112/99, Métropole télévision (M6), Suez-Lyonnaise des eaux, France Télécom and Télévision 
française 1 SA (TF1) v. Commission of the European Communities of 18 September 2001, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:215, II-02459. The General Court, in denying the existence of a rule of reason in 
Community competition law, states that “in several judgments the Court and the Tribunal have been 
concerned with indicating the dubious nature of the existence of a rule of reasonableness in Community law 
in competition matters (CJEU, C-235/92 P, Montecatini v. Commission of 8 July 1999, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:362, I-04539, par. 133 (“even admitting that the “rule of reason” plays a role in the art. 85, 
n. 1 of the Treaty”); T-14/89, Montedipe v. Commission of 10 March 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:36, II-01155, 
par. 265, and T-148/89, Tréfilunion v. Commission of 6 April 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:68, II-01063, par. 109). 
It would also be difficult, according to the judge's reasoning, to reconcile the existence of this interpretative 
criterion with the normative structure of art. 85 EC, which “explicitly provides, under n. 3, the possibility of 
exempting restrictive agreements in the field of competition if they meet a certain number of conditions, in 
particular when they are essential for achieving certain objectives and do not give companies the possibility 
of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products exam. Only in the precise context of 
this provision can a weighting be made of the pro- and anti-competitive aspects of a restriction (in this sense 
see, C-161/84, Pronuptia Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis of 28 January 
1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:41, I-00353, par. 24; T-17/93, Matra Hachette v. Commission of 15 July 1994, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:89, II-00595, par. 48, art. 85, n. 3 of the Treaty would lose much of its useful effect if such 
an examination were to be carried out under Article 85, n. 1 of the Treaty. P. MANZINI. The european rule of 
reason-Crossing the sea of doubt. In: European Competition Law Review, 23, 2002, p. 392-399. O. ODUDU. 
A new economic approach to Artilce 81(1)? In: European Law Review, 6, 2002, p. 100-105. 
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explicitly recognize the influence that the doctrines of the rule of reason and per se rule (E. 
ELHAUGE, 2016, p. 464 et seq.) have had on the EU antitrust law, even though they did not 
reach the point to define art. 101.3 TFEU as an example of a european rule of reason. 
The same tendency of the EC to expand the number of the so-called safe harbors, or 
those categories of agreements that are presumed to be legal in themselves and, consequently, 
exempt from the prohibition under art. 101, paragraph 1, TFEU,76 very closely resembles the 
category of per se permission developed and applied overseas. 
It should not, however, forgotten that there are significant differences between the 
European system and the US, starting from the fact that Section 1 of the Sherman Act does 
not provide a list of behaviors deemed anti-competitive similar to that of article. 101.1, nor 
does it provide for a system of exemptions such as the one referred to in art. 101.3. (A. 
ITALIANER, 2013, p. 4 et seq.) It seems, therefore, difficult to talk about a European rule of 
reason, because, for the purposes of the application of art. 101 TFUR, the analysis of the 
agreements never goes so far as to balance the pro and anti-competitive effects, regardless of 
whether they are restrictions by object or effect. (R. SCHÜTZE & T. TRIDIMAS, 2018) 
Moreover, unlike the provisions of the per se rule, art. 101.1 TFEU does not provide for 
hypotheses in which any restrictions are deemed automatically and necessarily unlawful, 
since such cases could still possibly be exempted as per paragraph 3. 
If, on the one hand, it is inevitable to find in the judgments of the European judge 
some analogies with the American methods of evaluation of the agreements, it does not seem 
correct to classify the restrictions “by object” and “by effect” ex art. 101 TFEU (R. 
SCHÜTZE & T. TRIDIMAS, 2018) as mere transpositions of the doctrines per se rule and 
rule or reason. These parameters may in fact have represented a starting point for the 
European antitrust legislation, but have been further developed and adapted in line with the 
characteristics of the Community market, through a system of analysis of the agreements 
altogether different from that of overseas. 
                                               
76  This approach was adopted by the Commission with the Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the 
Treaty and, subsequently, with two different regulations in order to offer companies the requisite legal 
certainty by introducing an explicit exemption for certain categories which can be presumed, by virtue of 
their characteristics, which comply with the conditions set out in Article 101 (3) of the Treaty. This is the 
Regulation (EU) n. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of 
Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialization 
agreements published in OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 43-47 and of the Regulation (EU) n. Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreement 
published in OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p . 36-42. 
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In particular, the system of exemptions referred to in paragraph 101.3 has gone so far 
as to simply allow an assessment of the agreement in terms of economic efficiency, but also in 
terms of protection of public interests. It therefore seems out of place to try to bring the 
valuation methods of art. 101 TFEU with those of the per se rule and rule of reason, since 
these are different legal systems that have developed different approaches that better respond 
to the needs of the relevant market. Given, therefore, that it does not seem correct to talk 
about the European rule of reason in relation to art. 101, (R. SCHÜTZE & T. TRIDIMAS, 
2018) it is however evident that the approach followed by the EC and from CJEU in 
evaluating restrictive agreements by effect provides few firm points to companies wishing to 
direct their conduct in advance in order to avoid antitrust penalties. The use of an economic 
analysis of the effects of the cartel is, in fact, both essential and problematic from the point of 
view of compliance with the principle of legal certainty. In conclusion, it is hoped that the 
economic models used in this type of analysis will be better defined and so that companies 
can have more certain parameters to be able to assess ex ante the possible illegitimacy of their 
conduct. 
 
8. THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL CERTAINTY BY REFERENCE FOR A 
PRELIMINARY RULING: THE CASE/PROBLEM OF THE ARBITRATORS 
 
If the preliminary ruling by the judges of ordinary or administrative courts does not 
pose particular problems, the more complex is the case in which it is an arbitrator or an arbi-
tration body to want to appeal to the CJEU pursuant to art. 267 TFEU. (T. OPPERMANN, 
C.D. CLASSEN & M. NETTESHEIM , 2016)  Despite the fact that the CJEU has already on 
several occasions expressly stated that the referee is not recognized the possibility of making 
a reference for a preliminary ruling,77 this approach is still the subject of a heated debate in 
doctrine especially by those who criticize the reasoning by which Court concludes that it de-
nies this authorization. (W.P. GORMLEY , 1968, p. 552 et seq.; G. BEBR, 1985, p. 490 et 
seq.; X. DE MELLO, 1982, p. 392 et seq.; M. FRIEND, 1983, p. 358 et seq.; L. IDOT, 1996, 
p. 562 et seq.; G. CHABOT, 2005, II, p. 10079; H. VAN HOUTTE, 2005, p. 432 et seq.; M. 
OLIK & D. FYBACH, 2011; S.H. ELSING, 2013, p. 46 et seq.) 
                                               
77  CJEU, C-102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern 
AG & Co. KG and Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG, of 23 March 1982, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:107, I-01095; C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo and Others v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij of 27 
April 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171, I-1477; C-125/04, Guy Denuit and Betty Cordenier v. Transorient-
Mosaïque Voyages et Culture SA of 27 January 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:69, I-00923. 
 
 
 
Meritum – Belo Horizonte – v. 13 – n. 2 – p. 286-334 – Jul./Dez. 2018 
 
316 
The consequences of the non-recognition of this possibility by the CJUE are signifi-
cant if we consider the close link between the arbitration and the European Union law and the 
increasingly frequent use of this method of resolving disputes in commercial transactions due 
to the ever increasing influence that European Union law has on commercial operations. (C. 
BAUDENBACHER & I. HIGGINS, 2002, p. 16 et seq.) 
  The risk is, therefore, that this approach impedes a uniform application of the 
principle of legal certainty within the common market, since a significant number of decisions 
binding on the parties, such as those issued by the arbitrators. 
According to art. 267 TFEU, which regulates the request for preliminary ruling before the 
CJEU (R. BARENTS, 2009; B. MORTEN & F. NIELS, 2014)  in order to guarantee a 
uniform interpretation and application of EU law, art. 267 TFEU confers to the jurisdiction of 
the Member States the possibility of turning to the CJEU for the latter to rule i) on the 
interpretation of the Treaties and ii) on the validity and interpretation of the acts carried out by 
the institutions, bodies or bodies of the Union. The main problem related to the scope of this 
rule is the vagueness of the term “jurisdiction” and, therefore, the uncertainty as to which 
courts are actually entitled to make the reference for a preliminary ruling. (B. MORTEN & F. 
NIELS, 2014) 
In the Vaasseen sentence,78 the CJEU established the criteria for the first time in the 
light of the interpretation of this term, indicating the characteristics that a body must have in 
order to be considered a jurisdiction under article 267 TFEU. (B. MORTEN & F. NIELS, 
2014) The CJEU referred in particular to the admissibility of the reference for a preliminary 
ruling by the Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor her Mijnbedrijf, the arbitral court in 
charge of settling disputes relating to social security in the Netherlands. On that occasion the 
CJEU affirmed that even legal bodies other than ordinary courts, such as an arbitration court, 
can make a preliminary reference if the following conditions are met: i) are established by 
law, ii) are permanent organs, iii) the their jurisdiction is obligatory, iv) they apply norms of 
law and vi) they are independent.79 On the basis of these criteria, the Scheidsgerecht van het 
                                               
78  CJEU, C-61/65, Sig.ra G. Gœbbels, vedova Vaassen v. Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf of 30 June 1966, 
ECLI:EU:C:1966:39, I-00408. 
79  CJEU, order: C-49/13, MF 7 a.s. v. MAFRA a.s., of 14 November 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:767, published in 
the electronic Reports of the cases. According to settled case-law, in order to assess whether the remitting 
body possesses the characteristics of a” jurisdiction “within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, a matter 
which is relevant only to EU law, the Court takes into account a number of elements such as legal origin of 
the body, its permanent nature, the binding nature of its jurisdiction, the contradictory nature of the 
proceedings, the fact that the body applies legal rules and that it is independent. In particular see, C-54/96, 
Dorsch Consult of 17 September 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:413, I-04961, par. 23; del 31 maggio 2005, C-
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Beambtenfonds voor her Mijnbedrijf was considered in all respects a court pursuant to art. 
267 TFEU, since it was constituted by a Dutch law, its jurisdiction is obligatory for the 
parties, is a permanent body and applies legal rules. (B. MORTEN & F. NIELS, 2014) 
Following this same approach, the CJEU declared on other occasions the request for 
a preliminary ruling by jurisdictions other than ordinary courts. In the Broekmeulen 
decision,80 the CJEU accepted the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Netherlands 
Commission of the complaints concerning generic medicine, using the conditions identified in 
the Vaasseen sentence.81 The Committee, in fact, was established with the consent and 
cooperation of the Dutch public authorities, provide for a procedure that takes place in respect 
of the adversarial between the parties and the decision is binding and final. Equally 
admissible were references for preliminary rulings made by an arbitration board responsible 
for resolving disputes between the parties to collective agreements stipulated between 
employers and workers organizations82 and by an independent office called Immigration 
adjudicator.83 
On the contrary, the CJEU has not recognized the status of jurisdiction pursuant to 
art. 267 TFEU compared to some administrative authorities: this is the case of the Amtsgericht 
Heidelberg, a local court responsible for keeping commercial records. According to the CJEU, 
at the time of the reference for a preliminary ruling there was no appeal pending before the 
Amtsgericht between the parties, a circumstance which contributes to the status of a non-
judicial body but merely an administrative one.84 Similarly, the preliminary reference by the 
                                                                                                                                                   
53/03, Syfait and others of 31 May 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:333, I-04609, par. 29; C-246/05, Häupl of 14 
June 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:340, I-04673, par. 16; C-394/11, Belov of 31 January 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:48, published in the electronic reports of the cases, par. 38)”. See also: C-54/96, Dorsch 
Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH of 17 September 1997, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:413, I-04961; C-516/99, Berufungssenat V der Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, 
Niederösterreich und Burgenland v. Austria of 30 May 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:313, I-04573. 
80  CJEU, C-246/80, C. Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie of 6 October 1981, 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:218, I-02311. 
81  As we can see in the same spirit in the case: C-448/8, Münchener Hypothekenbank of 6 September 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:770, not published. 
82  CJEU, C-109/88, Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening of 
17 October 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:383,  I-03199. 
83  CJEU, C-416/96, Nour Eddline El-Yassini v. Secretary of State for Home Department of 2 March 1999, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:107, I-01209. 
84  CJEU, order C-86/00, Amtsgericht Heidelberg v. Germany of 10 July 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:394, I-05353. 
In eh same spirit of orientation also in the next case: C-134/97, Victoria Film A/S v. Sweden of 12 November 
1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:535, I-07023: It should be borne in mind that it follows from settled case-law that 
national courts can refer the matter to the Court only if a dispute is pending before them and if they have 
been called upon to adjudicate in a procedure intended to result in a judgment of a judicial nature (see order, 
C-318/85, Greis Unterweger of 5 March 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:106, ECR 00955, par. 4; C-111/94, Job 
Centre of 19 October 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:340, I-03361, par. 9). 
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Bezirksgericht Bregenz, an Austrian registry office whose job it was simply to verify the 
correspondence of the requirements for the registration of trademarks and patents, without 
having any jurisdictional function was not considered to be admissible.85 
 
9.  (FOLLOWS) REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING BY ARBITRATION 
COURTS 
 
The CJEU attributes to the character of mandatory jurisdiction in order to consider 
satisfied the requirements of art. 267 TFEU. (R. SCHÜTZE & T. TRIDIMAS, 2018) This 
feature was used by the CJEU to assess the admissibility of a reference for a preliminary 
ruling also with reference to the arbitral tribunals. 
In the Nordsee sentence,86 ruling, the most significant on the subject, the CJEU 
stressed that when an arbitral tribunal is established and regulated by statutory norms it 
assumes a role much more similar to that played by ordinary courts, thus being able to fall 
within the notion of jurisdiction under art. 267 TFEU. If, on the contrary, there is no 
obligation, in fact or in law, for the parties to bring proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, 
but this choice depends only on a private agreement that does not involve public 
                                               
85  However, even if there are elements in this case which could suggest that Skatterättsnämnden exercises a 
judicial function, in particular the status of independence conferred upon it by its establishment by law and 
the power to issue decisions of a binding nature by applying the rules of law, other elements they lead to the 
conclusion that it basically plays an administrative role. “Since it is not in charge of making any decision 
with regard to Victoria Film but having to limit itself to issuing an opinion, the Skatterättsnämnden must be 
regarded as a body with exclusively administrative functions. See, C-178/99, Bezirksgericht Bregenz v. 
Austria of 14 June 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:331,  I-04421. 
86  CJEU, 102/81, “Nordsee” Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern 
AG & Co. KG and Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG of 23 March 1982, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:107, I-01095.  The commercial arbitration, in fact, originates in a contract and is aimed at 
resolving a dispute arising on the same; the involvement of the public authority is absent and the parties do 
not have an obligation-either in law or in fact-to refer the matter to the arbitrators, if not once they have 
agreed to insert the arbitration clause. It is considered that the tendency of the CJEU to exclude the 
postponement by courts of commercial arbitration is justified, in addition to the absence of the criteria 
mentioned above, also in light of the fact that, while excluding the postponement, the protection of the right 
Union is simply “delayed” in the sense that it can be guaranteed at the appeal stage. In this regard, the Eco 
swiss judgment states that: “the arbitrators, unlike a national court, cannot ask the CJEU to give preliminary 
rulings on matters relating to the interpretation of EU law. Now, the European legal order has manifestly an 
interest, in order to avoid future divergences of interpretation, to ensure a uniform interpretation of all the 
provisions of EU law, regardless of the conditions in which they will be applied [...] EU requires that 
questions concerning the interpretation of the prohibition set forth in art. 85, n. 1 of the Treaty can be 
examined by the national courts called to rule on the validity of an arbitration award and may be the subject, 
if necessary, of a reference for a preliminary ruling before the CJEU [...]”, sentence: Eco Swiss, op. cit., par. 
40. See also: CJEU, C-377/13 Ascendi Beiral Litoral of 12 June 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1754, published in 
the electronic Reports o the cases, parr. 97-98. The Ascendi Beiral Litoral cases-which decided that tribunals 
in legally mandatory arbitration have the possibility of referring issues of EU law interpretation to the CJEU 
for a preliminary ruling-cannot be transposed to investment arbitration tribunals. For details see: R. 
CARANTA, G. EDELSTRAM & M. TRYBUS. European Union public contract law: public procurement 
and beyond. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2013. 
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administrations, the CJEU excludes that in this context the preliminary reference may be 
declared admissible. The same interpretative approach was taken up later in the Eco Swiss87 
decision, in which the CJEU reaffirmed that “the arbitrators, unlike a national judge, can not 
ask the Court to give preliminary rulings on matters relating to the interpretation of european 
law” (R. SCHÜTZE & T. TRIDIMAS, 2018) and in the Denuit sentence, in which the concept 
was once more reiterated that “since, in the case in the main proceedings, there is no 
obligation, either in law or in fact, to entrust the resolution of their disputes to arbitration and 
because public authorities of the Member State concerned are not involved in the choice of 
the way of arbitration, the Collège d'arbitrage de la Commission de Litiges et Voyages can not 
be considered national jurisdiction of a Member State under article 234 EC”.88 In the specific 
case of arbitration in relation to investments, it is questioned whether the arbitration 
investment courts can make the reference referred to in art. 267 TFEU, considering that this 
duty-faculty was excluded for the commercial arbitration courts. This is supposed, in light of 
the fact that the arbitration in the matter of investments - unlike commercial arbitration-
                                               
87  The CJEU has specified its position in the Mostaza Clara case when it was adjudicated to decide whether the 
National Court could determine whether the contested award was contrary to European public policy, 
although in the arbitration proceedings this exception had not been raised. On this point, the CJEU held that: 
“[...] the need for effectiveness of the arbitration proceeding justifies the fact that the control of arbitration 
awards is of a limited nature, and that the annulment of an award can be obtained only in exceptional cases 
[...]”, par. 34, case: C-168/05, Mostaza Claro of 26 October 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:675, I-10421. In its 
argument the CJEUconfirms that the exception of European public order cannot be abused, with the risk of 
reducing the effectiveness of the praises; however, this exception can be accepted when the appeals courts 
would accept it in order to avoid a violation of the national and European public order. In other words, the 
exception of public order also takes ex officio, when it concerns a violation of the legal system in which the 
award must be recognized. Inevitably, both the national public order and the European public order fall under 
the orders of a Member States. On this point, in the case of Eco Swiss, the CJEU ruled that: “[...] it should 
also be noted that the need for effectiveness of the arbitration procedure justifies the fact that the control of 
arbitral awards is of a limited nature and that an arbitration award can be declared void or the recognition is 
denied only in exceptional cases [...]”, case: C-126/97, Eco Swiss of 1st June 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, I-
3055, par. 35. In the case of Eco Swiss China, the CJEU has declared a progressive tendency towards 
“communitarization of public order, which should find further moments of development also through the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR”. The necessary application rules have been variously defined. According to the 
traditional approach: “with the exception of the necessary application rules are identified those substantially 
functional substantive rules aimed at safeguarding the political, social and economic organization of the State 
of the forum [...] it is self-limited rules as their field of application is established, unilaterally, by the state 
order of which they are expressed [...]”. According to Audit: “[...] on parle de lois de police pour designer le 
mécaniMember Statese d’application d’une règle interne à une situation internationale en fonction de sa 
volonté et indépendamment de sa désignation par une règle de conflit”. B. AUDIT Droit International privé, 
LGDG, Paris, 2008, pp. 97. The necessary rules of application can have both a state and a supranational 
origin (Buxelles Convention 1974, The Hague Convention, 1978) and be linked to third-type sources 
(European Court of Justice, UN). See also: M. LÓPEZ-GALDOS. Arbitration and competition law. 
Integrating Europe through arbitration. In: Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 7 (6), 2016, p. 
384 et seq. 
88  CJEU, C-125/04, Guy Denuit and Betty Cordenier v. Transorient-Mosaique Voyages and Culture SA of 27 
January 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:69, I-00923, par. 16. R. WHISH & D. BAILEY. Competition law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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presents such peculiarities that could make it one of the jurisdictions for which the reference 
for a preliminary ruling as per art. 267 TFEU. (J. USHERWOOD & S. PINDER, 2018) More 
specifically, in the arbitrations now under discussion, questions relating to public law are 
raised-often, in fact, the conduct of a Member State is the subject of the dispute. These 
arbitrations, then, have their source in an international agreement concluded between two 
States and, also for this reason, the involvement of public authorities is clear. However, it does 
not appear that the public and non-private character, vice versa typical of commercial 
arbitrations, is sufficient to suggest that the arbitration boards in the field of investment are 
recognized powers, excluded from those that regulate a dispute in commercial matters. In 
favor of this conclusion, the jurisprudential interpretation of art. 267 TFEU (A. 
KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, 2016) and, in particular, the concept of “court of a Member 
State” referred to by that provision. On the concept of belonging to a state legal system, the 
CJEU has established a series of conditions in the presence of which a court belongs to the 
national legal system. 
Although the position taken by the european judge seems to be clear, as will be better 
explained in the following paragraph, it is recognized by some as the possibility of 
“circumventing” the refusal to carry out the preliminary ruling by reminding the so-called 
golden bridge, (S.H. ELSING, 2013, p. 50 et seq.) which consists of the examination of the 
preliminary questions by the national courts both in the revision of the arbitration award and 
by providing assistance to the arbitrators during the proceedings. It would therefore be a 
matter of indirectly appealing to the CJEU on the most problematic issues concerning the law 
of the European Union. 
It emerges from the jurisprudence of the CJEU that only in very circumstantial cases 
the reference for a preliminary ruling from an arbitral tribunal was declared admissible, 
whereas in most cases, when the resolution of the disputes by an arbitrator is the result of a 
discretionary choice by the parties, this authorization is denied. This approach of the CJEU is 
still debated in doctrine among those who favor this interpretation (G. BEBR, 1985, p. 489 et 
seq.; M. SCHWAIGER, 2007, p. 304 et seq.) and who, on the contrary, provide arguments to 
support a different conclusion. (M. BENEDETTELLI, 2011, p. 584 et seq.) 
The main arguments supporting the position of the CJEU concern i) the literal 
interpretation of article 267 TFEU; ii) the risk of an excessive increase in the Court's 
workload; iii) the risk of manipulation of the preliminary reference instrument and, finally, iv) 
the risk of eliminating the characteristics of effectiveness and speed of the arbitration. (A. 
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KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, 2016) 
As regards the first observation, this was proposed by the British Government in the 
Nordsee case relying on the fact that the language used in article 267 TFEU89 refers 
exclusively to jurisdictions officially recognized by the Member States, thus excluding those 
courts, such as arbitration, established through private agreements. 
The second argument is based on the concern that, declaring admissibility references 
from arbitrators also admissible, the CJEU finds itself having to cope with an excessive 
number of requests, also due to the lack of knowledge of the EU law by the referees which, as 
is well known, do not necessarily have to be lawyers or jurists. (S.H. ELSING, 2013, p. 52 et 
seq.) Advancing this fear was the Advocate General Reischl in the aforementioned Nordsee 
case, who said that “we must consider the risk of a workload, difficult to assess, for the CJEU 
that in this way would be distracted from their duties principal, in favor of private disputes 
that are often of minor importance [...]”. (R. CARANTA, G. EDELSTRAM & M. TRYBUS, 
2013) 
A further argument in favor of the refusal to grant a preliminary ruling by the 
arbitrator concerns the fact that, since the parties have more control over the proceedings 
before the arbitrator than the one established before ordinary courts, they could decide to end 
it only to avoid being bound by the decision of the CJEU if the outcome was not what they 
had hoped. (M. SCHWAIGER, 2007, p. 307 et seq.) 
Finally, it was highlighted how the procedure pursuant to art. 267 TFEU before the 
CJEU can last for years and may not guarantee an adequate level of confidentiality, thus 
undermining those characteristics of arbitration that in most cases encourage the parties to opt 
for that solution rather than establish a judgment before the ordinary judge. (S.H. ELSING, 
2013, p. 54 et seq.) 
These arguments have not convinced that part of the academic community that, on 
the contrary, believes that even the arbitrators chosen contractually by the parties should be 
able to sue the Court pursuant to art. 267 TFEU. Indeed, it has been pointed out that in 
arbitrations concerning international trade law, arbitration is often not a free choice of the 
parties but rather an almost obligatory choice. Therefore, ensuring compliance with EU law in 
                                               
89  In the same spirit see, C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo et al. v. NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij of 27 April 1994, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:171, I-1277, “[...] it follows from the principles of the primacy of Community law and of 
its uniform application, in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, that a court of a Member State to which 
an appeal against an arbitration award is made pursuant to national law must, even where it gives judgement 
having regard to fairness, observe the rules of Community law, in particular those relating to competition law 
[...]”. 
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an ever-increasing number of arbitration decisions binding on the parties becomes crucial. 
With respect to the risks of an excessive workload for the CJEU or that the parties do 
not follow the decision of the CJEU interrupting the proceedings before the arbitrator 
considering it decisive from the moment the objections could be raised also in relation to the 
references for preliminary rulings raised by ordinary courts when they act in support of the 
arbitral tribunals or in the review of the decisions. 
In fact, the hypothesis of using the so-called “golden bridge” as an alternative for the 
referees to indirectly resort to the CJEU does not convince. In this way, in fact, the possible 
problem of a greater workload for the CJEU would be simply postponed, thus causing a waste 
of time and resources. Moreover, this mechanism presupposes that the procedural rules of the 
Member States provide for the possibility for arbitrators to seek assistance from ordinary 
courts, as happens for example in the german system, otherwise there is no real alternative to 
the preliminary ruling regulated by art. 267 TFEU. (R. SCHÜTZE & T. TRIDIMAS, 2018) 
The relevance attributed to the private nature that distinguishes the choice of arbitrators by the 
parties and, consequently, to the absence of statutory norms that regulate the procedure (S.H. 
ELSING, 2013, p. 56 et seq.) is also called into question: in many Member States, in fact, the 
possibility of Arbitration tribunal in place of an ordinary judge is provided for by codified 
rules that authorize the arbitrators to issue rulings with effects similar to those of ordinary 
court rulings. 
In conclusion, the arguments supporting the traditional CJEU approach do not fully 
convince, contrary to the more pertinent need to contribute to the correct and uniform 
application of the principle of legal certainty. It may therefore be more worthwhile to extend 
the time limit for the arbitration to have a decision that respects the principle of legal 
certainty, and more generally the law of the European Union, given the increasingly 
widespread use of operators and commercial investors to this method of resolving disputes 
within the single market. It is therefore hoped that the CJEU will review its approach in the 
sense of allowing even the arbitrators contractually appointed by the parties to raise questions 
for a preliminary ruling pursuant to art. 267 TFEU. (R. SCHÜTZE & T. TRIDIMAS, 2018) 
 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Precisely the stability of the market constitutes the objective of protecting legal 
certainty. The identification of the legal value of legal certainty. What was controversial was 
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the coordination of the same principle with respect to the other norms of primary law. 
The identification of proportionality, as a criterion for applying legal certainty, as a 
general principle of European Union law, has led to the identification of the concrete forms of 
protection of the stability of the legal and economic framework. Consequently, the same legal 
treatment of protection against foreign investors whose investment risks being frustrated by 
unforeseen and/or unpredictable interventions by Member States, must now be recognized 
also by companies that only operate within the National territory. In any case, it will be 
fundamental to balance the aforementioned legal certainty with the additional general 
requirements that underlie the adoption of the authoritative measures: the suitability to 
achieve the public goal and the impossibility of adopting less invasive measures they 
constitute the two parameters of detail that allow to respect proportionality and, therefore, to 
consider legitimate the intervention of the State in the market. On the contrary, the certainty of 
the law is different in relation to the phase of execution of economic activities. If, in fact, the 
competition law seems to guarantee the freedom of companies also by the undue intrusion of 
public administrations, as well as by abuses, the same rules discount certain differences in the 
jurisprudential application that oscillate between the definition of the strict prohibition of 
conduct and agreements between companies up to the evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
same with respect to the further objectives of a public nature: also in this case, the CJEU even 
if it has never recognized a complete application of the US rule of reason, has led to the 
application of a sort of proportionality adapted to the requirements of protection of 
competition. In this way, agreements are justified between companies, concerted practices or 
abuses of a dominant position that result in the benefiting of consumers or of better protection 
of further publicity needs that must be balanced with free competition. 
In any case, whether it is access to the market or protection of competition, legal 
certainty remains an absolute prerogative for companies that needs constant balancing with 
the further provisions of the Treaties. The national judges are called to the material exercise of 
reconciliation, which, through the examined procedural instruments, can directly apply the 
principles set out in the body of work and provide an effective protection to companies whose 
rights have suffered a compression. 
There remains, however, a large limit to the effectiveness of legal certainty: its 
european source means that its direct application can only be invoked in matters falling within 
the scope of European Union law. 
In the EU, although there has recently been a greater acceptance that article 101, 
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article 102 TFUE90 and merger analysis (D. LIAKOPOULOS, 2010) should converge around 
a single analytical framework based on uniform concepts, it has been seen that the system 
governing agreement in fact continues to rely much more heavily on presumptions of both 
illegality and legality than in the US and in the EU’sown dominance and merger frameworks. 
In consequence, few agreement cases exist in which a balancing of actual or likely restrictions 
on parameters of competition against efficiencies is actually required. Our analysis proposes 
that EU decision-takers should become more willing to analyse whether theory, experience 
and especially context justifies a finding that an agreement is restrictive by object. Up until 
now, they have been more disposed to have regard to experience and context as a mechanism 
for expanding the by object category than as a means of narrowing it. To ensure that the object 
category is not overinclusive, it is essential that it be confined to agreements demonstrating a 
high likelihood of anticompetitive effects (capability, potential or likelihood of 
anticompetitive is insufficient) and that it should not be applied in cases where the restraint on 
competition is not obvious. 
If the breadth of the object category is more realistically limited, a claimant will 
more frequently be required to demonstrate restrictive effects (actual or likely) before the 
parties can be required to provide a robust justification of the efficiencies within article 101(3) 
TFUE. The EU administrative framework provides a flexible forum for the competing effects 
of agreements to be scrutinised and balanced. If the EC were to bring more effect cases, 
resources could be concentrated on developing the article 101 framework (rather than the 
limits of the by object category) and clarifying important issues such as the role of the EU 
ancillary restraints and objective necessity principles. Although these doctrines may have 
made sense in the pre-modernized era (and when getting an article 101(3) TFUE exemption 
for an agreement was frequently impractical) and make sense as characterization mechanisms, 
                                               
90  For analysis see: L. LOVDAHL GORMSEN. A principled approach to abuse of dominance in European 
competition law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; R. NAZZINI. The foundations of European 
Union competition law: the objective and principles of article 102. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; R. 
O’DONOGHUE & J. PADILLA. The law and economics of article 102 TFEU. Oxford & Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2013; P. NIHOUL. The ruling of the General Court in intel: Towards the end of an effect-based 
approach in European competition law? In: Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 5, 2014, p. 52 
et seq.; J. BOURGEOIS & D. WAELBROECK (eds). Ten years of effects-based approach in EU competition 
law: State of play and perspectives. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012; J. DREXL, W. KERBER & R. PODSZUN 
(eds). Competition policy and the economic approach: Foundations and limitations. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishers, 2011; L. LOVDAHL GORMSEN. Are anti-competitive effects necessary for an analysis 
under article 102 TFEU? In: World Competition, 36, 2013, p. 224 et seq.; A. KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND. 
European Union Law. London & New York: Routledge, 2016; F. MARTUCCI. Droit de l'Union Europèenne. 
Paris: LGDG, 2017; M. POIARES MADURO & M. WIND. The transformation of Europe: twenty-five years 
on. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 321 et seq.; A. MANGAS MARTÍN. Tratado de la 
Uniòn Europea - Tratado de Funcionamiento. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2018. 
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they are harder to rationalise within a modernized framework which requires economic 
analysis at both the article 101(1) and article 101(3) TFUE stage of the assessment.91 Not only 
do the cases seem to miss some important steps in competition analysis but they appear to 
demand inquiries under article 101(1) TFUE which duplicate or overlap with analysis 
required in the process of applying article 101(3) TFUE.92 
We see a larger purpose for courts and antitrust enforcement agencies in the EU and 
the US to focus additional attention upon the framework for assessing restrictive agreements. 
Intense discussions about disparities in how the two jurisdictions treat unilateral conduct seem 
to eclipse important differences in the evolution of the essential tools for assessing concerted 
action. Mutual reflection on the different evolutionary paths could deepen understanding 
about possible doctrinal options and inform improvements in both regimes. This also could be 
the occasion for a broader examination of how experience across all of the shared areas of 
competition law-agreements, dominant firm conduct, and mergers-could guide the 
establishment of a unified analytical framework that ensures that the assessment of all forms 
of antitrust-relevant conduct is liberated from the need to place behaviour in certain historical 
categories and instead concentrates upon core conceptsinvolving the presence of actual or 
likely anticompetitive effects and the existence of valid business justifications. 
It may become clear at a subsequent stage that a standard-based approach more 
accurately captures the nature and the likely effects of the practice in question. This fact does 
not mean, however, that legal change is easy, even in the absence of a formal doctrine of stare 
decisis. By the same token, the fact that CJEU (and national Courts, too) stick to a particular 
line of case law cannot in any way be interpreted as meaning that judges are not familiar with 
contemporary debates. If there is something that stems from the analysis above, it is that EU 
courts have a very solid grasp of mainstream economics and have regularly displayed 
remarkable intuition about the logic behind corporate strategies. Adherence to a well-
established precedent simply reveals that there are typically other factors at play when the 
convenience of overruling it is considered. The question is as a result far more complex in 
practice. Judges, regardless of the discipline, are routinely asked to rule in instances in which 
previous judgments sit at odds with each other. Refining doctrines and addressing 
contradictions between individual cases are essential tasks fulfilled by courts. Much could be 
                                               
91 D. LIAKOPOULOS, The regulatory autonomy in the EU and WTO after Lisbon Treaty and the need of reform 
of the EU Institutions for the commercial disputes, op. cit. 
92 R. SCHÜTZE, T. TRIDIMAS, Oxford principles of European Union law, op. cit. 
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gained-more, it is submitted, than what would be gained by sticking to precedent-if the two 
lines of case law Delimitis converged into the approach (standard-based) that is now known to 
be more appropriate and that has decidedly been endorsed by the CJUE in future. (D. 
LIAKOPOULOS, 2016) 
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